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THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT:
FEDERALIZING NORMS FOR OFFICER,
LAWYER, AND ACCOUNTANT BEHAVIOR
LARRY CATA/ BACKER t

INTRODUCTION

In response to a number of corporate scandals, the federal
government enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "Act").
The Act creates a framework of government oversight of the
accounting profession and its practices, imposes a number of
certification requirements on corporate officers, restricts a
number of corporate practices involving trading of securities by
and loans to corporate officers, imposes reporting duties on
lawyers, and provides protection for employees who disclose
violations of law perpetrated by corporate officers and directors.
This Article explores some of the changes made by the Act in a
practice context. The Article focuses on the manner in which the
Act might affect corporate behavior in a number of common
business situations involving: people considering the offer of a
position as a corporate officer; accounting firms seeking to
perform audit and other functions for a corporate client; officers
seeking loans from their employer corporation, including
advances of fees pursuant to indemnification agreements;
corporations facing adoption of financial codes of ethics; lawyers
seeking guidance on the situations in which they are now
required to report evidence of corporate wrongdoing;
implementing internal accounting and disclosure systems and
disclosing wrongdoing; people seeking guidance on the protection
t Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law,
<lcbll@psu.edu>. My thanks to all of the participants at the Symposium: Enron
and Its Aftermath, St. John's University School of Law, Jamaica, New York (Sept.
20, 2002), where the materials in this Article were presented. Special thanks to
Jayne Barnard, F. Jay Mootz and Cheryl Wade for their comments on earlier
versions of this Article. My research assistant, Bryan Ackerman (Penn State '03),
provided outstanding work on this Article.
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afforded by the Act for reporting corporate wrongdoing; and
officers facing criminal penalties for certain types of wrongdoing.
The relationship of the Act to state corporate law and the Act's
inconsistencies, traps for the unwary, and unanswered questions,
are also explored.
The twenty-first century exploded onto the consciousness of
the business community in a big way. Since the unification of
Germany in 1989, and more vigorously since the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991 and the entry of the People's Republic of
China into the world marketplace thereafter, American methods
of business have been held up to the world as the approach most
worth emulating.' This was particularly the case with respect to
the American public corporation.
The American public
corporation worked best because it was based on democratic
principles of corporate governance, which mirrored and worked
in synergy with the governing ideal of- nation-states. 2 The
American corporation was grounded in a regime of full disclosure
of information about enterprises that sought to minimize
transaction costs and market inefficiencies of corporate debt and
equity. 3 Furthermore, it represented a form of enterprise in
1 See Suzanne Kapner, S.E.C. Chief Promises to Cooperate With Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at W1; see also Carolyn Brancato & Michael Price, The

Institutional Investor's Goals For Corporate Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25
DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 46-47 (2000) (describing Delaware as a global model for
corporate governance); Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United
States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance
Debate, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 865, 866 (1997).

With perhaps a bit of nostalgia, a high level American accounting policymaker
best expressed both the old and emerging realities: "Traditionally, the argument
from the United States has been that if we want to have an international set of
rules, they ought to be U.S. rules, because we have the best system," said Robert H.
Herz, the Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, in a recent
interview. Referring to the Enron, WorldCom and other corporate scandals, Mr.
Herz said, "The recent events have led people to question whether our system is
that much superior, and it has increased receptivity toward international
accounting standards." Kapner, supra note 1.
2 See, e.g., Lee A. Travis, CorporateGovernance and the Global Social Void, 35
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487 (2002). For an example of the way in which the
essentially political notion of democratic governance has seeped into discussion of
organizing principles for enterprises and other sub-national communities, see Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal
DemocraticTheory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395 (2000).
3 For a discussion of the basic notions underlying the regulation of transactions
in corporate securities, see LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 1 (2d ed. 1988); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders,and Informational

Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979). For a

20021

FEDERALIZING NORMS

which exit within highly liquid markets was favored 4 and
shareholder interest given pride of place. 5 The checks and
balances of highly developed principles of corporate fiduciary
duty, outside auditing of financial statements, constant
disclosure, severe rules against advantaged transactions in
corporate securities, and an active shareholders and creditors
6
bar provided a model fit for emulation worldwide.
discussion of state duties to disclose, see, for example, Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The CorporateDirector'sFiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49
VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1996). The functionaries of the SEC routinely reaffirm the
underlying principle of disclosure as the basis of modem corporate and securities
regulation. For example, on the eve of the current round of corporate scandals, the
SEC Chairman explained that "[hligh quality and timely information is the lifeblood
of strong, vibrant markets. It is at the very core of investor confidence." Arthur
Levitt, Chairman's Statement to Sec. & Exch. Comm'n on Regulation Fair
Disclosure (Aug. 10,
2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldisal.htm
[hereinafter Levitt]. For a more iconoclastic view of the current regime of disclosure
as a means of regulating markets, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 15.8, at 444 (4th ed. 1992) (suggesting that the disclosure
regime was based on erroneous lessons from the market crash of 1929); Larry E.
Ribstein, Form and Substance in the Definition of a "Security": The Case of Limited
Liability Companies, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807 (1994).
4 The germinal work of the economist Albert Hirschman provides a useful
conceptual framework for understanding the modern focus of the development of
capital market rules, especially for public companies. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN,
EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970). The corporate law permits shareholders a limited
right of participation by virtue of their right to elect the board of directors and to
vote on fundamental corporate changes. The corporate and securities laws preserve
a shareholder's power to liquidate her holdings in an enterprise and realize
something approaching the fair value of her investment when participation or
loyalty are not viable alternatives. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 687 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that shareholders' only
alternatives when they disagree with management are "(1) his ability to persuade a
majority... of his fellow shareholders that the action should not be taken, and
ultimately (2) his ability to sell his stock"); William T. Allen, Ambiguity in
Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895, 897 (1997) ("Primarily, corporate law
affords common stock a right to vote .... The right of shareholders to sell their
share interests ... is fundamental as well as an economic source of constraint on
the exercise of management discretion.").
5 See, e.g., ALI'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (1994) ("[A]
business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of such activities with
a view to enhancing the corporation's profit and the gains of the corporation's
owners, that is, the shareholders."); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to IncreaseIts Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32.
6 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the
Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133,
1147, 1153 (1999) (noting the convergence of major global systems with movement
of non-U.S. systems to U.S. style shareholder model and movement of United States
toward more global model); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1145, 1147-48 (1998). But see, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A.
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In the year 2001, the world saw the disclosure of fraud and
corruption at the highest levels of the American corporate
hierarchy. One example is when the controlling family of the
Aldelphia Corporation used the public corporation as a personal
banking service, thereby causing the corporation's collapse, and
their criminal prosecution. 7 Another example is Worldcom,
where outright fraud in the preparation and reporting of its
financial condition resulted in the misstatement of its value in

McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The
Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1999). For a
taste of the American academic literature on the subject, see generally Yakov
Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Trading Across
Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411 (1996); Merritt B. Fox, Securities
Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV.
2498 (1997); Michael Gruson, The Global Securities Market: Introductory Remarks,
1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 303; James R. Silkenat, Overview of United States
Securities Markets and Foreign Issuers, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 84 (1994). Other
institutions, notably the World Bank, have taken similar positions, seeing a
connection between the American political and its corporate/securities model
throughout the developing world. "[it is neither coincidental nor wholly unexpected
that the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development have been
key supporters of studies that explore the relationship between economic
liberalization and democracy." Shelley Feldman, NGOS and Civil Society:
(Un)Stated Contradictions,554 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 46, 58 (1997);
see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). According to Milhaupt:
Of course, the flow of ideas has never been one sided. Approaches to
corporate governance and securities regulation can flow into the U.S. as
well. Japanese economic success has prompted a thorough re-examination
of American governance mechanisms. Both Japan and, to a lesser extent,
South Korea have been held up by American commentators as attractive
alternative models of economic and social organization. At the same time,
American economic successes, including most recently those associated
with Silicon Valley, have prompted extensive soul searching in Japan and
South Korea, leading to the importation of governance technologies
perfected on this side of the Pacific.
Milhaupt, supra, at 1158-60.
7 See Christopher Stern, Members of Rigas Family Indicted; 3 Ex-Adelphia
Officials Accused of Conspiracy, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2002, at El (noting that the
Rigases "[allegealy] used Adelphia funds to cover more than $250 million in
personal stock losses"); see also Bill Bergstrom, Adelphia Boss Took in $67 Million;
Agents Document Hefty Advances from Cable Firm, CHI. TRIB., July 29, 2002, at 6
(alleging that bills from family owned companies, including the Buffalo Sabres prohockey team, a furniture and interior design company, a car dealership, and a
number of partnerships, were allegedly paid out of Adelphia bank accounts);
Geraldine Fabrikant, Indictments for Founder of Adelphia and Two Sons, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at C1 (asserting that the three are charged with conspiracy,
securities fraud, wire fraud and bank fraud in connection with their economic
activities involving Adelphia).
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excess of six billion dollars, causing its own collapse.8 Enron
Corporation collapsed under the weight of its own convoluted
Ponzi schemes and now faces investigation for possibly criminal
manipulation of markets. 9 It may have also contributed to the
recent electrical crisis in California. 10 There were other collapses
and scandals as well. Among the most spectacular collateral
collapses was that of Arthur Andersen, once one of the most
powerful and influential accounting and related-service firms in
the world."
With its partners subject to criminal and civil

8 See, e.g., Shawn Young et al., WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J.,
July 22, 2002, at A3 (explaining that WorldCom filed for bankruptcy protection
after accumulating $41 billion of debt due to, in part, misstating $3.8 billion in
expenses for five quarters); see also The Lessons of WorldCom, WASH. POST, July 23,
2002, at A16 ("WorldCom's accounts were spectacularly misleading: Nearly $4
billion in expenses were misreported, creating a huge overrepresentation of the
firm's profits."); Jon Van, Ex-WorldCom Execs Charged with Fraud; 3 Others Likely
to Plead Guilty, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 29, 2002, at 1 (noting that WorldCom's accounting
irregularities were reported as high as $7.1 billion, nearly twice the amount
originally disclosed).
9 See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Shell Game; How Enron Concealed Losses, Inflated
Earningsi!-and Hid Secret Deals. Are Criminal Charges Next?, FORBES, Jan. 7,
2002, at 52 (stating Enron used a network of external partnerships to hide the
declining value of its assets); see also Alexei Barrionuevo et al., Enron's Fastow
Charged with Fraud,WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2002, at A3 (noting that Former Enron
chief financial officer, Andrew Fastow, was charged with fraud, money laundering
and conspiracy by federal prosecutors); Carrie Johnson & Peter Behr, Charges Near
in Probe of Enron Officer; Former CFO Fastow Is Task Force's Focus, WASH. POST,
Sept. 26, 2002, at El (stating that investigators from the Justice Department's
Enron task force and the Securities and Exchange Commission attempted to prove
that former executives knew, or should have known, that Enron was dependent on
sham asset sales and inflated financial deals); Allan Sloan et al., Who Killed Enron;
It's the Scariest Type of Scandal: A Total System Failure,NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 2002,
at 18 ("[A] handful of executives and outsiders made millions by investing in offbalance-sheet deals with Enron that played a large role in destroying the
company.").
10 See, e.g., Kenneth Bredemeier, Agency to Probe Energy Firms, WASH. POST,
Aug. 14, 2002, at El ("The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission yesterday
ordered a formal investigation into allegations of manipulative electricity and
natural gas trading by three Enron Corp. affiliates ... at a time when consumers
were handed huge utility price increases."); see also Scott Thurm et al., Juice
Squeeze: As California Starved for Energy, U.S. Businesses Had a Feast, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 16, 2002, at Al ("A detailed examination of recently released internal
memos by Enron Corp. lawyers, transcripts of trader conversations gathered by
investigators, and scores of interviews with market participants and regulators
yields a comprehensive look at how the U.S. energy industry cashed in on and
contributed to California's energy crisis.").
11 See, e.g., Allan Sloan et al., No Accounting for It, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 25, 2002,
at 34 (noting that Andersen, Enron's outside accountants, was said to be responsible
for shredding the energy company's documents during its audits); see also Andersen
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investigation and its assets subject to a large number of civil
suits by those who have suffered losses allegedly as a result of
Andersen's provision of services, the company has been reduced
to a shadow of its former self.12 Large chunks of the business
were sold or spun off. 13 The Andersen employees who could find
other jobs took business with them. 14 Even the largest banking
Fades Away, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2002, at H2 (stating Arthur Andersen officially
surrendered its license to practice accounting in all 50 states and that "[tihe firm
will wait at least a year to officially close its doors to help shield former partners
and their new firms from lawsuits by shareholders of Enron, WorldCom and other
now-bankrupt clients"); David S. Hilzenrath, Financial Watchdog Became an
Enabler, WASH. POST, June 16, 2002, at A20 (stating that Andersen, one of the
world's largest accounting firms, announced to the Securities Exchange Commission
on August 31, 2002 that it would stop auditing companies listed on stock markets);
Sheila McNulty & Gary Silverman, Andersen the Fallout; Verdict Delivers Final
Blow to Andersen Conviction, FIN. TIMES, June 17, 2002, at P26 ("Even before the
verdict, the firm... had become a pariah in the business community and fodder for
television comedians poking fun at the rich and powerful."); E.A. Torriero & Robert
Manor, Jury Finds Andersen Guilty; Auditor Convicted of Obstructing U.S.
Investigation of Enron Failure; Firm Says Verdict 'Effectively Ends' its Core
Practice, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 2002, at 1 (explaining that following Andersen's
conviction for obstruction of justice, "the firm acknowledged that the conviction
'effectively ends' its auditing practice").
12 See, e.g., Edmund Sanders & Jeff Leeds, U.S. Indicts Enron Auditor Over
Shredding;Inquiry: Andersen Faces an Obstruction of Justice Charge After Failing
to Reach a Plea Agreement with Prosecutors, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at Al
(noting that federal prosecutors indicted Andersen for allegedly orchestrating the
destruction of Enron documents); see also Delroy Alexander & Naftatli Bendavid,
Andersen Dismisses 7,000 U.S. Employees; Ex-Enron Auditor Duncan Expected to
Plead Guilty, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 9, 2002, at N1 ("[Tihe indictment has caused the
legendary Chicago-based firm to fall apart quickly, with auditing clients, foreign
affiliates and U.S. tax partners abandoning Andersen in recent weeks."); David S.
Hilzenrath, Doubts Grow That Andersen Can Survive, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2002,
at El ("Industry observers said they doubted that Andersen can stay in business.");
Sheila McNulty & Peter Spiegel, Enron Auditor to Plead Guilty and Co-operate,FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at 28 (stating that David Duncan, the Andersen partner who
headed the Enron audit, prepares to plead guilty to obstructing justice for
destroying large amounts of Enron documents).
13 See, e.g., Jerry Hirsch, L.A. Andersen Partners Talking to Rival Firms, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2002, at C1 (stating that Andersen partners negotiated to sell off
parts of their business to rival accounting firms, such as KPMG and Deloitte &
Touche); see also Delroy Alexander, 275 Andersen Employees Resign to Create Own
Firm, CHI. TRIB., May 22, 2002, at N1 (explaining that former Andersen employees
form Huron Consulting Group while taking 75 clients with them); Thomas S.
Mulligan, Andersen Near Deal on Consulting Unit, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at C3
(noting that Andersen nears deal to sell its consulting business to KPMG
Consulting, Inc).
14 See, e.g., Jerry Hirsch, Company Fading From Big 5 Picture, L.A. TIMES,
June 17, 2002, at C1 (noting that Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers all have benefited by picking up former Andersen clients).
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enterprises have been affected. For example, Citigroup has been

the subject of investigation with respect to its activities for
several of these collapsed giants. 15 The practices of several
broker dealers have been subject to review as well. 16 Corporate
executives have had to give back large amounts of compensation
awarded to them. 17
Lawyers have also been affected.
Companies caught up in the financial scandals of their officers

and directors have at times attempted to cast the net of liability
8
widely enough to catch corporate general counsel.'
Some firms have also acquired many former Andersen employees, such as Ernst &
Young, who hired 200 former Andersen partners and approximately 1,000 staff
members. Id.
15 See, e.g., Gary Silverman, Citigroup to Reform After Enron Scandal, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at 17 ("Congressional investigators have said Citigroup and
JP Morgan Chase bankers helped Enron disguise the extent of its debts through
complicated financial transactions."); see also Adrian Michaels & Gary Silverman,
Citigroup Faces Research Reform Hurdles, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at P25
(stating that Citigroup is under investigation by New York State Attorney General,
Eliot Spitzer, with regards to conflicts of interest on the part of analysts at its
Salomon Smith Barney investment banking unit).
16 For example, Merrill Lynch & Co. analysts were under investigation by Eliot
Spitzer, the New York State Attorney General, for allegedly recommending Internet
stocks that they regarded as "junk." See, e.g., E. Scott Reckard, Brokers May Face
More Suits Amid Probe, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at Cl ("[Alnalysts speak in
depreciating-and at times obscene-terms about stocks that at the time sported
the analysts' highest ratings."). Furthermore, Senate investigators cited sources in
which Merrill Lynch aided Enron by raising the energy company's stock ratings.
See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Merrill Ties to Enron at Issue in Probe; Senate Panel to
Look at Firms' Relationship, WASH. POST, July 30, 2002, at El. In addition, the
House Financial Services Committee sought details from Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc. and Credit Suisse First Boston regarding their business dealings with various
companies, including Enron and Global Crossing, Ltd. See, e.g., House Widens IPO
Probe to 2 More Banks, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at Cl.
17 For example, Jack Welch, the former chief executive officer of General
Electric, received retirement benefits that included 24-hour access to a companyowned jet; a Mercedes-Benz; tickets to Wimbledon tennis matches, Boston Red Sox
baseball games, and the Metropolitan Opera; free dry cleaning; and a fully-stocked,
company-owned Manhattan apartment. See, e.g., Jonathan Finer, Welch Cuts Back
Perks; GE's Former CEO Cites 'Perception' of Retirement Package, WASH. POST,
Sept. 17, 2002, at El. Welch and GE agreed to revise the retirement package,
though he still is entitled to receive an office with administrative support and a nine
million dollar annual pension. Id.
18 See, e.g., Jonathon D. Glater, Lawyer Caught in Tyco Tangle Leaves Friends
Wondering, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at C1 (stating that general counsel of Tyco
accused of being part of conspiracy to loot the company). "Tyco's lawsuit paints Mr.
Belnick as a part of a web of impropriety that allowed top executives to steal
hundreds of millions of dollars and dole out money to other employees and perhaps
even to a member of the board, thereby encouraging others to keep quiet." Id. The
company seeks to compel Belnick to return all money paid to him while he served as
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These corporate scandals also have had other wide-ranging
effects. Among these were the large lay offs of employees, which
have contributed both to individual suffering and to the already
lackadaisical performance of the U.S. economy. 19 The scandals
also contributed to continued weakness in the securities markets
by reducing the value of the wealth of many people and, thus,
potentially putting more strain on service sector spending by
government. 20 The popular press and other influential organs of
organized political activity clamored for governmental "action" of
some type. 2 1 As a result, the federal government acted, and it
acted in a big way. By passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 22 the
federal government has changed the business landscape in
significant ways for four groups most intimately connected with
general counsel. Id.
19 See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Jobless Report Shows Rebound Has Weakened;
Unemployment Rate Swells to 5.9%, WASH. POST, July 6, 2002, at El (asserting that
joblessness rose to 5.9% in June 2002 due to the slumping stock market and
corporate scandals).
20 See, e.g., Steven Pearlstein, Wild Day Leaves Dow Under 8000; Losses Raise
Fear of Damage to Economy, WASH. POST, July 23, 2002, at Al (stating that the
Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped nearly 3 percent after heavy trading on a
single day). "Sunday's announcement by WorldCom Inc. of the biggest corporate
bankruptcy filing in U.S. history no doubt contributed to yesterday's sour mood by
reminding investors and traders that the fallout from accounting scandals is far
from over, with more revelations, indictments and bankruptcies almost sure to
follow." Id. "Investors also hammered the stocks of two of Wall Street's leading
investment banks, Citigroup Inc. and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., on the eve of Senate
hearings into the firms' role in helping Enron Corp. hide its deteriorating financial
conditions from investors and rating agencies." Id.
21 See, e.g., Post-EnronProgress, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2002, at A14; see also
Molly Irvins, A Long Way to Go on CorporateReform, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 2002, at
N23; John Lewis, Corporate Scandal: Cleanup Must Move Beyond Lip Service,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 11, 2002, at A14; Make Businesses More Accountable,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 26, 2002, at F8; Felix G. Rohatyn, An Agenda for
CorporateReform, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at A16.

22 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. The statute was enacted in response to
the increase in restatements of corporate earnings, specifically from Enron,
WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Xerox. See The Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Paul Sarbanes, Member, Senate Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs). "I simply want to note that the problems
leading to such dramatic lapses are widespread and seem to be built into the system
of accounting and financial reporting. That is what this legislation seeks to
address." Id. Prior to drafting the bill, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Public Affairs held ten hearings that heard from experts and interested parties.
Id. In addition, the House Committee on Financial Services also held hearings
regarding corporate and auditing accountability. The bill was signed by the
President on July 30, 2002.
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the governance of American public corporations-corporate
managers and directors, accountants, and lawyers.
The purpose of this Article is to explore some of the ways in
which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act might have affected general
conduct norms in a number of situations common to most
American publicly held enterprises, and the lawyers and
accountants who form an integral part of the governance of those
enterprises. The Article is organized along the lines of questions
23
presented to the panel on the role of professionals after Enron.
Each of the questions focuses on the effects of the Act on the
behavior of key groups of professionals: officers, directors,
lawyers, and accountants.
1.

The Wall Street Journalrecently had a story indicatingthat
many CEOs and other executives are turning down new jobs
since the publicity over corporatescandals,2 4 due to fear of
fear possible liability. If a candidatefor a CEO position
came to you, the lawyer, for advice, what would you advise
him or her to do to protect him- or herselfin deciding what
corporationto join? Would your advice change if it were a
manager much lower down the totem pole?

The current reaction of top executives to the changes in the
meshwork of legal obligation imposed by the federal government
through the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reminds me of
the very similar reaction of officers and directors immediately
after the publication of the Delaware Supreme Court's 1985
decision in Smith v. Van Gorkum. 25 At the time there were
predictions that it would be impossible to hire competent
directors, that insurance against director and officer liability
23 Symposium, Enron and Its Aftermath, St. John's University School of Law,
Jamaica, New York (Sept. 20, 2002).
24 See Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld & Rakesh Khurana, Fishingfor CEOs in Your Own
Backyard, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2002, at B2 (noting that top CEO job openings are
becoming harder to fill as Board of Directors turn to outsiders rather than insiders).
Due to the fallout from the Enron and WorldCom scandals, "'[tiop-tier stars are
more nervous than they've ever been,' the chairman of one of the largest executive
search firms warned recently." Id. Being an insider of a firm is seen as a liability. As
a result, fifty percent of CEOs in the top 200 firms are presently outside recruits (as
compared to seven percent in 1980). Id. CEO tenure has shortened from eight to
seven years, with dismissal being the reason for an early exit in one-third of the
firms. Id.
25 Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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would be impossible to acquire (and indeed for a time insurance
became very costly and hard to acquire) and as a consequence,
corporate governance would suffer. But that did not turn out to
be the case. 26 Several things happened. First, states enacted
new provisions that permitted corporations to shield their
directors from liability for garden variety breaches of the duty of
care; 27 the D&O insurance markets stabilized, 28 directors and
officers changed their behavior to comport with the holding and
dicta/advice contained in the Van Gorkum opinions, 29 and courts
30
applied Van Gorkum more or less reasonably.
Corporate officers and directors face a very similar situation
today after the passage of the Act. But in a sense, corporate
executives were lucky-the bulk of the changes inaugurated by
the Act will affect accountants and lawyers more directly and
significantly.
Having said that, corporate executives and
directors face a number of important new behavior modifying
rules. Executive certification under sections 30231 and 90632 of
26 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the
Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155 (1990). "By late 1987, the D & 0 insurance
market was no longer in turmoil. Although premiums continued to rise, the rate of
increase had slowed." Id. at 1156.
27 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). For discussion in the
academic literature, see, for example, Jeffrey P. Weiss, The Effect of Director
Liability Statutes on Corporate Law and Policy, 14 J. CORP. L. 637 (1989); see also
Jonathan W. Groessl, Delaware'sNew Section 102(b)(7): Boon or Bane for Corporate
Directors?, 37 DEPAuL L. REV. 411 (1987); Thomas C. Lee, Limiting Corporate
Directors' Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the Directors'
Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 239 (1987).
28 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 26, at 1156.
29 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standardsof Review in CorporateLaw, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 449 (1993).
30 For discussion of post-Van Gorkum judicial decisions, see, for example,
Charles M. Elson & Robert B. Thompson, Van Gorkom's Legacy: The Limits of
Judicially Enforced Constraintsand the Promise of ProprietaryIncentives, 96 NW.
U. L. REV. 579 (2002); see also William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of
Review of DirectorDue Care with DelawarePublic Policy:A Critiqueof Van Gorkom
and its Progeny as a Standardof Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449 (2002).
31 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241). Section 302 requires that executive officers
certify all Form 10-K and Form 10-Q reports filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The certification must affirm that the signing offer reviewed the report
and that it does not omit, or contain any untrue, statements of material fact. In
addition, the officer must certify, to the best of her knowledge, that all financial
statements contained in the report fairly present the financial conditions of the
company. Lastly, the officer must affirm that she maintains and evaluates any
internal control and report any deficiencies or fraud to the SEC, the company's
auditors, and the audit committee.

20021

FEDERALIZING NORMS

the Act centralizes and expands the nature and extent of the
reporting liabilities of directors and officers. Criminal penalties
have been created with respect to certification where none had
existed before, 33 and criminal penalties for existing crimes have
been increased. 34 Directors and officers now face far more
stringent reporting requirements for transactions in their
company's securities, 35 and face loss of a potentially significant
36
chunk of their compensation for violation of transaction rules.
It will now also be easier for the SEC to ban officers and
directors from serving in like capacity in other enterprises for
certain violations of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act") and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange
37
Act").
In a pre-Enron world, a CEO candidate was expected to
conduct a certain amount of due diligence about a potential job
32 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § -906 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350). Section 906
requires that the chief executive officer and chief financial officer draft a written
statement to accompany all financial statements contained in periodic reports to the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The statement must certify that the financial
statements fully comply with sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). Moreover, the certification must state that the
information contained in the report fairly presents the financial conditions and
results of the company's operations.
33 For example, under section 906, if the certifying officer knows that the
financial report does not comport with all of the section's requirements, then the
officer may be fined up to $1,000,000 and/or imprisoned for up to 10 years. Id. If the
certifying officer willfully certifies the report knowing that it does not comport with
the sections' requirements, then the officer may be fined up to $5,000,000 and/or
imprisoned for up to 20 years. See id.
34 For example, pursuant to section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act, the Securities
and Exchange Commission may bring a civil action against a violator of the
securities laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 17u(3)(A) (2000). The limits for penalty against a
violator range from a $5,000 minimum to $50,000. See 15 U.S.C. § 17(3)(B) (2000).
Under the Act, these penalties have increased.
35 See id. § 403 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)). Section 403 of the Act
requires directors and officers to report to the SEC any transaction of personal
holdings in the company within two business days after the transaction was
executed.
36 See id. § 304 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243). If a company is required to
prepare an accounting restatement because of a material non-compliance by the
company, then the chief executive officer and chief financial officer must reimburse
the company for any bonuses received or any profits realized from their personal
sale of company stock.
37 Sections 20(e) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)) and 21(d)(2) of the
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 77u(d)(2)) are both amended by section 305, granting the
federal judiciary the power to bar from service any officer or director who's conduct
is determined to be "unfit." Previously, the conduct must have been deemed to be
"substantially unfit."
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opportunity-but much of that due diligence was directed at "fit"
and corporate performance. 38 In our new post-Sarbanes-Oxley
Act world of liability, a CEO candidate must exercise care and
judgment, and must conduct her due diligence in some
significantly new ways. That care and judgment should focus on:
(1) internal corporate controls; (2) ethical rules in place; and (3)
the composition and functioning of the board of directors, and
principally the audit committee of the board.
Sensitivity to a corporation's culture of internal controls is
not something entirely new to publicly held corporations.
Certainly since the 1996 decision of Chancellor Allen in In re
Caremark InternationalInc. Derivative Litigation, 9 it has been
clear that, at least under Delaware law, public corporations have
had an affirmative duty to effectively monitor, or in the words of
Chancellor Allen, the corporate board has a "responsibility to
assure that appropriate information and reporting systems are
established by management ....-40 In a sense, this duty now
38 A taste of the approach can be gleaned from advice for companies seeking
high level executives. See generally Ram Charan, How to Lower the Risk in CEO
Succession, 17 LEADER TO LEADER 26,
26-32
(2002),
reprinted at
http://drucker.org/leaderbooks/L2L/summer2000/charan.html.
New
research
suggests that the market for corporate executives is far less rational than might be
assumed. See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE
IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARIsMATIc CEOs (2002) (looking at the market for CEOs
from the perspective of employers).
39 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
40 Id. at 969-970. There are those within the academic community, reflecting
perhaps the views of a certain segment of publicly traded company officers and
directors, who would give Caremark short shrift. For a description of one of those
arguments, see generally Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1619, 1674-75 (2001) (explaining that "Caremark may not really be a duty of
care case at all. It may be better understood as a case involving the duty to act
lawfully, an area that traditionally has fallen outside of the business judgment
rule.... As such, Caremark may be the corporate governance analog to the 'public
policy' exception of the employment-at-will doctrine"). But see Cheryl L. Wade,
Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the DirectorialDuty of Care
and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389 (2002); Harvey L. Pitt et al.,
DirectorDuties to Uncover and Respond to Management Misconduct, 11 INSIGHTS 5
(1997) (suggesting that there are ways to successfully deal with allegations of
misconduct, but boards must play an active role in dealing with employees who
breach company standards). It is possible to suggest that the practical effect of
Caremark for most public companies was essentially hortatory, especially in light of
the exculpations from many forms of liability for breach of the duty of care
exemplified by provisions such as Delaware Corporate Code section 102(b)(7).
However, whatever its "real" affect prior to 2002, I would argue that Caremark
provides the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act courts with a useful benchmark for
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finds its way into the internal controls certification requirements
of section 302 of the Act. 4 1 The historic sensitivity of a
corporation to issues of internal control will provide a potential
CEO with an indication of the likelihood of liability on this score.
A corporation whose board and officers have been more, rather
than less, aggressive about internal controls is an enterprise
that is less likely to be the victim of fraud or illegal conduct. To
that end, a potential CEO should try to familiarize herself with a
corporation's system of internal controls. She should also obtain
a sense of the nature and consequence of past improper conduct.
A corporation that has been subject, to multiple shareholder suits
or governmental civil or criminal investigations suggests the
culture of such an enterprise deserves some scrutiny before a
candidate accepts a position there. None of this is hard to do,
but it may require due diligence of the sort a CEO has been
accustomed
to perform in connection with corporate
combinations.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself provides another important
source of CEO due diligence in contemplating a job offer for a
public company. Section 404 of the Act will require a report by
management on the company's internal controls. 42 This report
interpreting and applying the new provisions.
41 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4)). The
chief executive officer and chief financial officer, upon certifying the Form 10-K and
Form 10-Q reports, must affirm that they have evaluated the effectiveness of the
company's internal controls and report any deficiencies or material weaknesses in
such controls. In this regard it may be useful to recall that as early as 1997, Harvey
Pitt, the now departed Chairman of the SEC, argued strongly for the adoption of:
[A] mechanism to ensure that directors learn sooner (rather than later) about
allegations of significant illegality by corporate officers or directors. Not every
claim or complaint must, or should, be channeled immediately to the company's
directors. There comes a point, however, at which a certain threshold of
seriousness has been passed (such as, for example, when outside counsel has
been retained to address the problem).
Pitt et al., supra note 40, at 6. Pitt looked to the Caremark case for a model of
corporate internal controls. Id. at 6-7.
42 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262). Section 404
of the Act requires the SEC to create rules requiring companies to include an
"internal control report" in their Form 10-K reports. The internal control report
must state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting and assess the
effectiveness of the internal control structure. See id. The SEC recently proposed to
amend Item 307 of Regulations S-K and S-B to reflect the requirements of sections
404(a). See Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 66208, 66219 (proposed Oct. 22, 2002) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270 and 274). Furthermore, an accounting firm
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must include an assessment of those controls 43 and must be
reviewed by the company's auditors. 44 A close reading of those
reports will likely form an important part of a potential CEO's
examination of the company. The potential CEO should not
necessarily be looking for a "clean slate"; indeed a set of clean
slate reports might raise red flags because it is unlikely that
systems of internal controls are perfect or function flawlessly.
Rather, what one is looking for are indications of honesty and
effort. A pattern of small problems and swift correction makes
for more comfort than reports indicating few but significant
providing services to the company must attest to and report on management's
assessment of the internal controls. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404 (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 7262(b)). The SEC proposed to amend Regulation S-X to reflect the
attestation and reporting requirement pursuant to section 404(b), but may delay its
effectiveness until the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is operational
and has defined attestation standards. See Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406
and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra, at 66208, 66220, 66224 (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270 and 274). Though the SEC
would not require a company to provide such attestations or reports until its
proposed rules become effective, a company who voluntarily provides an annual
report on the effectiveness of its internal controls and procedures for financial
reporting should follow up with existing accounting literature. Id. at 66224.
Similarly, auditors who voluntarily provide attestations before the effectiveness of
the proposed rules should "perform such attestations in conformity with existing
accounting literature regarding attestation engagements, including Section 501 of
the AICPA's Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements." Id.
43 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a)(2)). Lynn
E. Turner, the Chief Accountant for the SEC from 1998 to 2001, argued that the
CEO and CFO should be required by the audit committee to assess the company's
internal controls. He said, "[Tihe audit committee... should require the CEO and
CFO to provide to the audit committee and investors a report by management that
clearly states management's responsibility for establishing, maintaining and
ensuring an effective system of internal control actually exists and is operating....
If the executives are nervous about signing such a report, I suggest investors should
be nervous about the numbers." See Hearing on Accounting Oversight: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, Sec. Exch. Comm'n).
44 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b)). This is
not an entirely new requirement. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 required that a company's outside auditors develop systems capable of
detecting potentially illegal corporate acts, report those acts to the appropriate
officers, and to assess the response. The Act effectively increases the nature and
character of the auditor's assessment, but now more directly imposes on
management substantial responsibility for the development and maintenance of
internal control systems under section 404. See id.
The views of Harvey Pitt on these earlier requirements have been known for
some time. See Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, For Outside Accountants, the
New Obligations Imposed by the Securities Litigation Reform Act Go Way Beyond
Classical GAAS, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at B4.
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problems or no problems at all.
This last point raises the related matter of the general
culture of ethics within a corporation. A potential CEO should
be aware of the extent to which the corporation has maintained a
culture of ethical conduct at all levels of the corporate
organization. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act now requires the SEC to
issue rules respecting company codes of ethics for senior
financial officers. 45 The existence of these codes must be
disclosed on Form 8-K, along with changes in or waivers from
their provisions.
Corporations without ethics codes must
disclose the reasons for the failure to promulgate one. Potential
CEOs should determine whether a corporation has such a code
in place, what they provide, and the extent and manner to which
they have been enforced. Corporations that have required their
officers to certify, on a periodic basis, that they have read the
code and are in compliance with its, terms are probably less
likely to run afoul of the new requirements of the Act than those
that do not. Boards of directors that tend to waive their ethics
codes for expediency or for other reasons 46 are potentially trouble
in the making.
Much of the burden of the new requirements falls on the
audit committee of the board of directors. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act requires the SEC to direct the national exchanges to restrict
the listing of issuers who, by April 26, 2003, have not appointed
audit committees composed of independent members of the

45 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264). In the
Senate Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs Committee hearing on Feb. 12, 2002,
Senator Charles Hagel addressed concerns to former SEC chairmen that Enron
suspended its ethics code in 1999 and questioned if the SEC required any reporting
of that action. See Hearingon Enron Accounting and Investor Issues: HearingBefore
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of Sen. Charles Hagel). SEC Chairman David Ruder responded, "I don't
think, Senator, that there is any .direct reporting requirement.... One of the things
I said in my testimony was certainly that we should require-and this is something
the Commission can do-to go out and require the filing of an 8-K in events like that
where an ethics code is being suspended or certain types of conflicts are created." Id.
(statement of David Ruder, SEC Chairman).
46 Thus, for example, Max Hendrick III, a partner at Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P.,
Enron's outside law firm, asserted in a letter that the Enron board of directors
waived the company's ethics code on at least two occasions in 1999 to permit Fastow
(Enron's Exec. VP and CFO) to engage in certain financial transactions. See Letter
from Max Hendrick III to James V. Derrick, Jr., Executive Vice President and
General Counsel, Enron Corp. (Oct. 15, 2001), reproduced in 1325 PLI/Corp. 881,
915-18 (2002), availableat http://www.westlaw.com.
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board of directors. 47 The Act requires public accounting firms to
report directly to the audit committee, which is now responsible
48
for the appointment and oversight of the outside auditing firm.
The audit committee has limited authority to engage the
49
corporation's public accounting firm for non-audit activities.
Audit committee membership is limited to members of the board
of directors, and all of the members of the audit committee must
The audit committee must establish
be independent. 50
procedures to receive, retain, and treat complaints regarding
accounting, internal controls, and auditing matters, including
procedures to facilitate confidential and anonymous employee
47 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)). Section
301 of the Act requires the SEC to direct the national stock exchanges to restrict the
listing of companies who have not formed "independent" audit committees by April
26, 2003. The audit committee is a subcommittee of the board of directors who is
directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of any work
provided by an independent auditor. The idea for an audit committee was addressed
before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on January 24, 2002 regarding
the oversight of independent auditors. See Hearing on Enron Collapse: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002). Lynn
Turner, the former Chief Accountant for the SEC, said before the Senate Banking,
Housing & Urban Affairs Committee, "[T]he exceptions provided for in the rules of
the stock exchanges would still permit an audit committee member who is not
independent, should be eliminated." See Hearingon Accounting Oversight:Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002).
In addition, John Whitehead, former co-chairman of Goldman Sachs and Co.,
suggested before the Senate Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs Committee that the
audit committees of the board be composed of the most financially experienced
people. See Hearing on Post-Enron Accounting and Investor Protection Issues:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong.
(2002).
48 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(k)); see also id.
§ 301 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)). The Senate Banking, Housing, & Urban
Affairs Committee addressed the need for the audit committee to provide oversight
to independent auditors. See Hearing on Accounting Oversight: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002). Lynn
Turner, the former Chief Accountant for the SEC, said before the Senate Banking,
Housing, & Urban Affairs Committee, "[Tihe audit committee should, as I
mentioned previously, directly hire, evaluate and if necessary, fire the auditor." Id.
49 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(i)). For
example, it was suggested in the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing
on January 24, 2002, that the audit committee should be responsible for preapproving consulting contracts with an auditing firm. See Hearing on Enron
Collapse: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong.
(2002).
5o See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(m)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(m)); see
also Hearing on Accounting Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (suggesting that members of
the audit committee be independent).
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reports of questionable accounting or auditing matters. 51 The
audit committee must have the authority to appoint independent
counsel and to be funded sufficiently to comply with their
duties.5 2
A potential CEO ought to ensure that she is
comfortable with the composition, historic practices, and current
operations of the audit committee of the board.
In short, CEOs face the same sort of due diligence when
contemplating a job offer. The difference now is that, to some
extent, the consequences have become more important, and the
cost of error greater. More important, perhaps, the nature of the
due diligence inquiry has changed, in some substantial respects,
after enactment of the.
2.

The Act prohibits the corporationfrom extending personal
loans to any executive officer, except for consumer credit.
Does this new provision affect the ability of corporationsto
help new executives with their relocations? Does that then
limit the pool of potential executives by geography and based
on their financial wherewithal?

In drafting the provisions of the Act, Congress was
especially sensitive to what it characterized as the gross abuses
by corporate insiders who used corporate funds as personal piggy
banks to finance their personal activities. 53 For example,
Adelphia executives secured a number of loans from the
company to finance personal ventures. 54 Tyco executives had
very large loans forgiven through the payment of matching
55
bonuses.
§ 78j(m)).
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(m)(5) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(m)).

51 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(m)(4) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
52

53 For example, the House Financial Services Committee addressed concerns

with companies providing loans to their officers and directors. See Wrong Numbers:
The Accounting Problems at Worldcom: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 107th Cong. (2002). Congressman Jim Leach objected to loans from
companies to officers when he said, "[To put it plainly, it is self-dealing for a
corporate head to give himself a multi hundred million-dollar loan, and it is a
dereliction of duty for a board to go along." Id.
54 David Lieberman, Rigas Pleads Not Guilty; Adelphia Founder,4 Others Deny
charges, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2002, at B3 ("The family also allegedly led Adelphia to
guarantee more than $3 billion in loans to a Rigas-owned partnership to build a golf
course on family land and to supply company jets for personal use."); see also Sen.
Paul Sarbanes, Address to the U.S. Senate Regarding the Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act (July 8, 2002).
55 The popular press was full of stories about the investigation relating to a
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's solution to the problem of abuse
was to amend section 13 of the Exchange Act by adding
subsection k, prohibiting the extension of credit by an issuer to
executive officers and directors. 56 As a result of this provision,
corporate loan programs of virtually every description will be
prohibited.5 7 Existing loans will be grandfathered, unless the
loan terms are modified. 58 The provision raises a number of
questions. Many of these revolve around the issue of the
meaning of "credit" for purposes of the application of the statute.
The statute could be read narrowly to limit the power of the
company to extend credit only with respect to standard form
loans to executives. As such, the only credit covered under the
Act would be credit in forms otherwise available from third party
lenders. Reading sections 78m(k)(1) and (2) together, it is
possible to read the term "credit" in section (k)(1) to be limited to
the sorts of extensions of credit identified in section (k)(2)-home
loans, consumer credit, charge cards, and extensions of credit by
brokers and dealers. This produces a symmetrical reading of the
provision when read as a whole. There is legislative history to
support this narrower, but balanced interpretation of the
loan forgiveness program for Tyco executives. "More than 40 Tyco International Ltd.
employees received loans from the company worth tens of millions of dollars that
were later forgiven at former chief executive L. Dennis Kozlowski's direction,
raising fresh questions about how money flowed so freely to favored workers
without public disclosure." Ben White, Tyco CEO Arranged Forgiving of Loans,
WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2002, at El.
56 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)).
According to the Act:
It shall be unlawful for any issuer (as defined in section 2 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002), directly or indirectly, including through any subsidiary,
to extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the extension of credit, or to
renew an extension of credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for any
director or executive officer (or equivalent thereof) of that issuer.
Id. § 402 (to be codified at § 78m(k)(1)).
57 The Act provides a very small exception for home improvement and
manufactured home loans, consumer credit, extensions of credit under an open end
credit plan, charge cards, or extensions of credit by a registered broker or dealer,
provided these extensions of credit are made in the ordinary course and available to
the public. See id. § 402 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)(2)).
58 See id. § 402 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)(1)). Furthermore:
An extension of credit maintained by the issuer on the date of enactment of
this subsection shall not be subject to the provisions of this subsection,
provided that there is no material modification to any term of any such
extension of credit or any renewal of any such extension of credit on or
after that date of enactment.
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provision. For example, Congresswoman Mink expressed her
understanding of the provision as "prohibit[ing] corporations
from providing 'sweetheart' loans-that is, direct or indirect
59
personal loans-to or for any director or executive officer."
Senator Sarbanes also appeared to suggest the prohibitions of
the Act were meant to target 'sweetheart' loans of the type at
issue in the scandals surrounding companies such as Adelphia
and Tyco and that the provisions of sections k(1) and (k)(2) ought
to be read symmetrically. Section 402 of the Act "would still
prohibit corporate executives from reaping millions of dollars in
loans from their companies, but the new language also realizes
that executives need to use things such as credit cards to conduct
their business."60 Senator Feinstein also suggested that the
prohibitions would apply only to sweetheart loans when she
stated, "Company loans to executive officers are now prohibited,
sharply limiting the types of 'hidden' compensation that can be
offered to executives without being fully disclosed to
shareholders."61
A broader reading of the statute, however, is also possible.
There is nothing in the Act or in the legislative history that
compels symmetry between sections (k)(1) and (k)(2). None is
necessary. Moreover, the broadest reading of "credit" might well
be consonant with the overall remedial intent of the Act as a
whole. Certainly, there is some legislative history that might
support such a reading. Senator Feinstein, who introduced what
became the loan preclusion section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
spoke broadly of an intent to "prohibit all loans by a corporation
to its directors or executive officers." 62
Senator Sarbanes
described the provision as necessary to "keep executives from
63
obtaining corporate loans that are not available to outsiders."
59 148 CONG. REC. H5474 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Mink).

60 148 CONG. REC. S7355 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
61 148 CONG. REC. S6762 (daily ed. July 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
62

Id. at S6760. Senator Feinstein elaborated her intent to propose a provision

with very broad application:
I see no justification for providing loans to corporate directors or executive

officers. The goal of the reforms that we are currently debating should be
to create an environment in which outside directors and major corporate
officers act in as pure and honest a manner as possible. They should not

enter into any appearance of conflict, such as the conflict that occurs when
the corporation that they serve extends them a personal loan.
Id.
63 148 CONG. REC. S7360 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.76:897

My sense is that Congress did not really consider what it
meant by the terms of the provision they enacted, other than
that Congress wanted to prohibit the sort of loans at the heart of
the corporate scandals being covered in the press. In light of this
fairly concrete and memorialized Congressional intent-to
change corporate behavior deemed harmful without otherwise
effecting changes in the corporate law or corporate operationthe narrower rather than the broader reading of the meaning of
the term "credit" is appropriate.
The determination of the meaning of "credit" for purposes of
the loan prohibition provisions will have significant effect. A
broad understanding of the meaning of "credit" would sweep
within its definition a number of what had been unproblematic
transactions between executives and the company.
These
include cash advances against future bonuses and amounts
advanced to executives under corporate indemnification plans to
cover expenses incurred in connection with the defense of a
potentially indemnifiable action. 64 The narrower definition
might not. Corporations will have to look for alternatives to
attract and retain executives.
The most straightforward
alternative is to substitute direct payments for loans or by
increasing salaries. Of course, that poses a problem for many
publicly held corporations which face increasing press,
governmental, and shareholder scrutiny of salary and
compensation structures.
Prohibition of advances of potentially indemnifiable
expenses under a broad reading of the provisions of section (k)(1)
would affect significant change on current corporate practice. A
strong argument can be made, however, that whatever meaning
it is given, the advancement of expenses connected to an
indemnifiable action against an officer or director permitted
64 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2002); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 723,
725 (McKinney 2002). For a discussion of the attorney fee advancement provisions
of indemnification agreements under state corporate law, see, for example, Robert
P. McKinney, Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers: Indemnification, 40
VAND. L. REV. 737, 752-55 (1987); Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca,
Directors and Officers Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An Overview of
Legal and PracticalIssues, 51 BUS. LAW. 573, 581-82 (1996); E. Norman Veasey et
al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability,
Indemnification,and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399 (1987). For cases discussing the
advancement of attorneys fees under company indemnification rules, see, for
example, Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 823 (Del. 1992); Hibbert v.
Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339 (Del. 1983).
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under state corporate law ought not to come within the meaning
of "credit" extensions prohibited under new section 78m(k)(1).
First, such advances are not true loans, that is an extension of
credit where both parties understand that repayment will be
required. Indemnification advances are more aptly considered a
conditional obligation.
Only those executives who are not
entitled to indemnification will be required to repay the
advances. 65 Moreover, advances for expenses were not the sort of
transaction between the corporation and it officers or directors
66
that Congress had in mind when it enacted this provision.
More important, it is unlikely that Congress would preempt such
an integral part of state corporate law and practice in such an
offhanded manner. If Congress had intended to preempt this
portion of the state laws of indemnification, Congress would
have done so explicitly rather than by implication.
Applicability of new section 78m(k) to state indemnification
laws permitting advances of expenses raises a more general
point. To some extent, the new provision evidences the growing
importance of federal preemption of corporate law, at least with
respect to publicly traded companies.
New section 78m(k)
effectively makes provisions typically found in state corporate
law that permit loans to employees and officers unavailable to
publicly traded corporations but not to other corporations.67 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in this respect, constitutes another step in
the piecemeal creation of a federal corporate law applicable to
publicly traded companies.
3.

The Sarbanes-OxleyAct prohibitsregisteredaccounting
firms from performing auditsfor an issuer if they are also
performing certain nonaudit services, unless pre-approvedby
the firm's auditcommittee. The Senate Committee report on
Enron blamed Enron'sproblems on the accountants'role in
providing audit and nonauditservices. Would a bright-line
65 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (2002) (stating that repayment is

required "if it shall ultimately be determined that such person is not entitled to be
indemnified by the corporation").
66 See discussion of legislative history supra notes 62-63.
67 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (2002). The standard for approving

those loans is generally fairly low-usually loans may be made when in the
judgment of the board, such loan might reasonably be expected to benefit the
corporation. Id.
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test barringaccountingfirms from providing audit and
nonaudit services have been more efficacious in preventing
any future malpracticeby accountants?
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act sets forth a fairly rigid bright line,
essentially prohibiting the provision of non-auditing services by
a registered auditing firm during the time that firm performs
auditing services.6 8 However, the registered auditing firm may
perform both audit and non-audit services upon approval by the
company's audit committee, 9 if approval is obtained in the
manner specified in the Act. 70 The approval process is meant to
provide a closer connection between audit committee action and
the trading price of the company's securities.7 1 The expectation
68 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 745,
771 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g), (h). This section also prohibits registered
auditing firms from providing the auditing client, "contemporaneously with the
audit, an non-auditing service." Id. (to be codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1
(g)).
69 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(h) provides that "[a] registered public accounting firm may
engage in any non-audit service, including tax services, that is not described in any
of paragraphs (1) through (9) of subsection (g) for an audit client, only if the activity
is approved in advance by the audit committee of the issuer." See Sarbanes-Oxley
Act § 202 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(h)). The Senate Committee Report
indicated that though the Committee had "considered adopting a complete
prohibition on non-audit services by accounting firms for their audit clients ..
[they] instead decided on a somewhat more flexible approach." S. REP. NO. 107-205,
at 16 (2002).
70 New 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i)(1)(A) (2002) requires audit committee pre-approval
of such activities, and public disclosure to investors in periodic reports required by
section 13(a). See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 202 (to be codified at 78j-1(i)(2)). Preapproval responsibilities can be delegated "to 1 or more designated members of the
audit committee who are independent directors of the board of directors ... " Id. (to
be codified at § 78j-1(i)(3)).
71 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides a de minimus exception to the pre-approval
disclosure rules for non-auditing services if:
(i) the aggregate amount of all such non-audit services provided to the
issuer constitutes not more than 5 percent of the total amount of revenues
paid by the issuer to its auditor during the fiscal year in which the
nonaudit services are provided;
(ii) such services were not recognized by the issuer at the time of the
engagement to be non-audit services; and
(iii) such services are promptly brought to the attention of the audit
committee of the issuer and approved prior to the completion of the audit
by the audit committee or by 1 or more members of the audit committee
who are members of the board of directors to whom authority to grant such
approvals has been delegated by the audit committee.
Id. § 202 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i)(1)(B)). The Senate Committee
described this provision as available only in the "atypical circumstance where an
auditor is providing to the issuer a service that was anticipated to be an audit
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is that disclosure will affect the market price of shares. To that
extent, a market reaction to attempts to avoid more rigid
separations between audit and non-audit functions performed by
the same entity might be the most effective regulator of that
relationship between accountants and issuer. Even before the
passage of the Act, auditing firms had begun adjusting their
behavior in light of perceived governmental and market
pressures. Some of these firms had announced programs of
voluntary decoupling of audit and non-audit functions in the
wake of the post-2000 business and accounting scandals
Having posited this market and disclosure oriented
approach to the regulation of the relationship between issuer
and outside auditor, I should concede that the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act appears, to some extent, to be an admission that the marketdisclosure model, a model that has been the foundation of the
regulation of publicly held companies for most of the twentieth
century, has not worked as well as it should have.
In the future, the new regulatory, investigatory, and
disciplinary functions of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (the "Board") might prove to be a more
significant deterrent to accountant misconduct. 72 In addition to
fines,73 the Board can temporarily or permanently bar
service within the scope of the engagement, but is later discovered to be a non-audit
service." S. REP. No. 107-205, at 20 (2002).
72 Section 105 of the Act provides that the Board is authorized to conduct
investigations of accounting firms who allegedly violated the securities law, SEC
rules, Board rules, or professional standards. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(b)(1) (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7215(a)). During an investigation, the Board is also
authorized to hear relevant or material testimony from members of the firm and
compel the production of relevant or material documents. See id.
§ 105(b)(2)(A)(B)(C) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)). The Senate Banking,
Housing, & Urban Affairs Committee addressed the creation of an independent
auditing board on March 19, 2002. See Hearing on Post-Enron Accounting and
Investor Protection Issues: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Charles Bowsher). The Committee
discussed creating an accounting standards board by statute under the control of
the SEC. Id. (testimony of Charles Bowsher and Aulana Peters). Moreover, they
discussed the framework of the board and how it would differ from the independent
oversight offered by groups, such as FASB. Id. (testimony of Charles Bowsher).
73 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105(c)(4)(D) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
7215(c)(4)(D)). This section of the Act provides the Board the ability to impose civil
monetary penalties against violators of the securities law, the Board rules, SEC
rules, or professional standards. In general, a natural person may be fined no more
than $100,000 and no more than $2,000,000 for other persons such as corporations
and partnerships. See id. § 105(c)(4)(D)(i) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
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accounting firms from the market for public company audit
74
work.
4.

The Sarbanes-OxleyAct requires that each corporation
establish a code of ethics for senior financialofficers. What
sort of things would you advise be placed in that code? Does
having a code expose these officers to any additional
liability?
Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act compels the SEC to
issue rules by January 26, 2003, requiring a public company to
disclose whether it has adopted an ethics code "for senior
financial officers, applicable to its principal financial officer and
comptroller or principal accounting officer, or persons performing
similar functions." 75 The Act defines a code of ethics to mean:
[S]uch standards as are reasonably necessary to promote-(1)
honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of
actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and
professional relationships; (2) full, fair, accurate, timely, and
understandable disclosure in the periodic reports required to be
filed by the issuer; and (3) compliance with applicable
76
governmental rules and regulations."
There are a number of sources from which ethics rules can
be drawn. I might start with the ethics rules of the professional
organizations most closely tied to financial affairs and financial
reporting-accounting and law. Very influential will be the
ethical standards that the Board is required to establish under

7215(c)(4)(D)(i)). However, if the conduct is found to be intentional, knowing,
reckless, or repeatedly negligent, then a natural person may be fined up to $750,000
and no more than $15,000,000 for other persons. See id. § 105(c)(4)(D)(ii) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4)(D)(ii)).
74 See id. § 105(c) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)). With regards to
intentional, knowing, reckless, or repeatedly negligent conduct that violates the
securities laws, the Board rules, SEC rules, or professional standards, the Board
has the ability to temporarily revoke registration with the Board, suspend a person
from practice with a firm, and limit a person's activities. Id. The Board may also
invoke the penalties on a permanent basis. Id.
75 Id. § 406(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264).
76 Id. § 406(c) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264(c)); see also Hearingon Enron
Accounting and Investor Issues: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Hous., & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Arthur Levitt) (discussing
the need for new legislation in the face of an increasing corporate willingness to
breach ethical duties).
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section 103 of the Act. 77 These standards are to be developed
after consultation with professional accounting and advisory
groups. 78 The views and ethical standards of these professional
and advisory groups will also be influential. 79 Corporate law
might contribute as well. For example, the conflicting interest
transaction approach of Sub Chapter F of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) might provide a basis for
80
approaching the issue of conflicts of interest identification.
The greatest value of any code would lie in its efficiency-its
power to affect behavior in a positive way, and its effectiveness
in revealing potential areas of ethical concern in a timely
manner. The danger of any Code writing is the temptation to
use the Code as a means of expressing the loftiest notions in the
most hortatory terms, but providing little in the way of
implementing language or sanctions for violation of the ethics
rules. Rules that reflect the reality of the law and the conduct of
the business, that are easy to understand and easy to apply, and
that include well-understood consequences, provide the
foundation for a successful code of ethics. Providing the board of
directors with the mechanics for tempering the application or
consequences of the rules in appropriate cases, with or without a
shareholder approval feature, would make the ethics code fair.
The most well implemented code, of course, is the one
internalized by the relevant work force, that is, one that seems
part of a natural order of things. The provisions of the SarbanesOxley Act do not seem to add much to this project. The
economics of disclosure will result in the adoption of at least pro
77 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103(a)(1) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213). The
Board must require accounting firms to maintain work papers and other documents
for at least seven years, have all of its audit reports reviewed by an independent

auditor (either within or without the firm), and report on its internal control
reviews. See id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(i) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(i)).
78 See id. § 103(a)(1) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1)). The groups likely
to participate include organizations like FASB and AICPA. See Hearing on PostEnron Accounting and Investor Protection Issues: HearingBefore the Senate Comm.

on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002).
79 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Code of Conduct, for
example, serves as a basis for state regulation of the accounting profession. See Paul
B. W. Miller, Financial Accounting Regulations and Organizations, in 1
ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK § 2.4, at 2-31 (D.R. Carmichael et al. eds., 9th ed. 1999).

For an overview of the ethical standards developed by some of these groups, see, for
available
CONDUCT,
OF
PROFESSIONAL
CODE
example,
AICPA
http://www.aicpa.org/ about/code/index.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2002).
80 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.60(1) (2002).
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forma codes of ethics in virtually every reporting corporation. It
may also serve as an additional black-letter source of liability for
lawsuits, and in this manner provide a focal point for coercive
behavior modification. But we should keep in mind that it is the
conduct and not the code that ought to be the focus of any ethical
enterprise.
5.

If you are an attorney representinga company and you
become suspicious that the company is misrepresentingits
financialstatements, what should the attorney do? Does it
matter whether the attorney is in-house or in a firm? Are
there different risks for them? What potential liability does
the attorneypossibly incur if he or she fails to act in a
responsible manner?

Section 307 of the Act 8 l has introduced a very controversial
provision affecting lawyers. The Act compels the SEC to adopt
new rules of professional conduct applicable to attorneys
practicing before it in any way in the representation of issuers.
These rules are to include:
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar
violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal
counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the
equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the
evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial
measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring
the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of
the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of
the board of directors comprised solely of directors not
employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of
82
directors.
The SEC is also given the authority to censure any persons
appearing before it.3 The rule would apply both to corporate in81 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245).
82

Id. § 307(1)(2).

Section 602 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, adding section 4C to the Exchange
Act, provides the SEC with the authority to "censure any person, or deny,
temporarily or permanently, to any person the privilege of appearing or practicing
before the Commission" (for, among other reasons, willful violation or willful aiding
and abetting the violation of the securities law or the rules and regulations issued
83
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house attorneys and outside counsel.
These rules have potentially far reaching effects. Though
the section has worried various legal observers because it is
thought to put the attorney-client confidentiality relationship
into question, the plain language of the statute appears to
indicate an intention to preserve the confidential relationship
between attorneys and their corporate clients. Recall that under
section 1.13 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the
"Model Rules") attorneys represent the corporation rather than
the constituents or agents of the corporation.8 4 In that light, the
requirement to report first to inside counsel or the CEO, and
then to members of the board of directors, might be
characterized as merely expressing in specific context the
otherwise ordinary duty of the attorney to zealously represent
85
the corporate client under the Model Rules.
Moreover, section 307 of the Act is applicable to a subset of
legal violations-"material violation of securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty or similar violation"-covered by section 1.13 of
the Model Rules. With respect to these violations, the threshold
standard of knowledge of violation is reduced from knowledge of
a violation of legal obligation or law in the Model Rules to
"evidence of a material violation" in the Act.
On the other hand, the options for action by attorneys
discovering material violation of law or fiduciary duty are
limited. While the Model Rules provide for significant flexibility
and build in a system of proportionality (e.g., "the lawyer shall
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization"),8 6 the Act requires presentation of the evidence of
thereunder). See id. § 602 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3).
84 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2002) ("A lawyer employed
or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly
authorized constituents.").
85 Thus, it is possible to argue that the new reporting rules of section 307 of the
Act mirror the requirements under the Model Rules. Section 1.13(b) of the Model
Rules requires an attorney, who knows that any person associated with the
company will act or refuse to act in a manner that might be construed as a violation
of law imputable to the corporation, to act. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.13(b). The actions the attorney can take include seeking reconsideration,
advising that a separate legal opinion is necessary, or seeking referral of the matter
to higher authority in the organization, including, if appropriate, the board of
directors. Id. at R. 1.13(b)(1). Section 1.13(c) permits a lawyer to resign in the event
the highest authority of the company insists on action "that is clearly a violation of
law." Id. at R. 1.13(c).
86 Id. at R. 1.13(b).
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material violation to "the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof)." 7 In
addition, the Act requires the lawyer to present the issue to the
audit committee of the board of directors or other appropriate
committee of outside directors "if the counsel or officer does not
appropriately respond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary,
appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the
violation). 88 No safe harbor provision is provided in the event of
eventual inappropriate action by the board of directors. It is
possible that at this point Rule 1.13(c) of the Model Rules would
apply and permit the lawyer to resign. In this sense, it is
possible to view the section 307 requirements as part of a
package of institutional requirements to correct failures in the
market for gatekeeping services.8 9 With respect to lawyers, at
least, the failure is rectified through a focused fortification of a
lawyer's representation of corporate clients, but in keeping with
the spirit of the Model Rules. This sentiment appears to have
been expressed by the now departed SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt
in a speech delivered at the ABA 2002 Annual Meeting. 90
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307(1) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 7245(1)).
Id. § 307(2) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 7245(2)).
89 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid," 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1404-05 (2002). Thus, Professor John Coffee suggests
that underlying the extent of the market reaction to the corporate scandals from
Enron:
lies the market's discovery that it cannot rely upon the professional
gatekeepers-auditors, analysts, and others-whom the market has long
trusted to filter, verify and assess complicated financial information.
Properly understood, Enron is a demonstration of gatekeeper failure, and
the question it most sharply poses is how this failure should be rectified.
Id.
90 Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
2002), available at
Law Section (Aug. 12,
Business
Association's
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm. Chairman Pitt said:
We've been directed to ensure that appropriate standards of ethics and
competency are established, implemented and enforced. The profession
should examine itself and provide guidance about how its members should
behave that is broader than technical legality, and truly in the public
interest. The Report produced by Jim Cheek's Task Force is in the best
tradition of this kind of private sector self-examination. It reiterates that
"the organizationis the lawyer's client and that the lawyer owes that client
an obligation of protection from harm," and embodies the idea in SarbanesOxley that lawyers should fulfill their responsibilities to their ultimate
client ....While there will be details that we must consider as we develop
rules for attorney conduct, the underlying principle of Sarbanes-Oxley is
unassailable-attorneys must be vigilant in protecting the interests of
87
88
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The SEC recently proposed rule 205 to reflect the
requirements of § 307 of Act. 91 The proposed rule suggests that
the SEC will interpret its authority under section 307 quite
broadly. 92 The proposed rule "incorporates several corollary
provisions that are not explicitly required by section 307."93
Section 205.3(b) of proposed Part 205 codifies the "up the ladder"
reporting system for attorneys who practice or appear before the
SEC. 94 According to the proposed rule, an attorney's duty to
report is triggered when she "becomes aware of information that
would lead a reasonable attorney to believe a material violation
[of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation
by the company or agent thereof] has occurred, is occurring, or is
about to occur." 95 Once the duty to report is triggered, the
attorney is required to report the material violation to the
issuer's chief legal officer or chief executive officer.9 6
Subsequently, the CLO or CEO is obligated to determine
whether the report has any merit, and if it does, to remedy the
situation.9 7 If the CLO or CEO find that the report does not
have merit, then they must report their findings to the
attorney. 98 An attorney only fulfills her obligations once she
"receives an appropriate response within a reasonable time and
has taken reasonable steps to document his or her report and the
response to it has satisfied his or her obligations under the
rule." 99 An attorney who does not receive an appropriate
response, or if she believes that reporting the violation to the
CLO or CEO is futile, must report the violation to the issuer's
audit committee or a subcommittee of the board of directors
containing independent directors or to the full board. 100 The

their true clients.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
91 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71670, 71673 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
92 The
proposed regulations are introduced as an expression of the
Commission's "intention to implement a robust system" in response to the mandate
represented by section 307. See id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 71674.
95

Id.

96 Id.
97

Id.

98

Id.

99 Id.
100

Id.
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attorney is also required to document the response, or absence
thereof, of her report as it travels "up the ladder." 1 1 The SEC
indicates that the attorney's record should "typically include the
date, time, location, manner, and substance of the report and the
10 2
response and the identity of witnesses to either."
Proposed rule 205.3(d) outlines the obligations of both
outside and in-house attorneys who report material violations
and do not receive an appropriate response. 10 3 An outside
attorney who does not receive an appropriate response to her
report is required to withdraw from her representation, notify
the SEC of her withdrawal on the basis of "professional
considerations," and disaffirm any submission to the SEC that
10 4
they have participated in that may be tainted by the violation.
The SEC notes that the outside attorney's withdrawal is
consistent with the Model Rule 1.16.105 An in-house attorney
who does not receive an appropriate response is required to
disaffirm any submissions she participated in that may be
tainted by the material violation, but she is not required to
resign. 06 Furthermore, pursuant to proposed rule 205.3(d)(4),
the SEC provides protection to an attorney, whether outside or
in-house, who reasonably believes was discharged because she
Under the proposed
fulfilled her reporting obligations. 10 7
protection provision, the attorney may report her discharge to
the SEC without violating the attorney-client privilege,
presumably based on the whistleblower protections provided by §
08
806 of the Act.'
Under certain circumstances an attorney may submit
confidential information to the SEC without breaching the
attorney-client privilege. Pursuant to proposed rule 205.3(e), an
attorney may use documents she prepared to defend against
allegations of attorney misconduct. 10 9 Moreover, proposed rule
205.3(e)(2) permits an attorney to reveal confidential information
to prevent the commission of an illegal act that the attorney
101

Id.

102

Id. at 71684.
Id. at 71674.
Id. at 71674, 71683

103
104

105 Id.
106 Id.
107
108

Id.
Id.

109 Id.

at 71684.
at 71674.
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reasonably believes "will result either in perpetration of a fraud
upon the Commission or in substantial injury to the financial or
property interests of the issuer or investors." 110 The SEC
indicated that Model Rule 3.4 is in accordance with this
provision."'
Despite the length and breadth of the proposed rules, the
provision itself still suffers from a number of ambiguities.
Among those areas of ambiguity are the quantum of evidence
sufficient to give rise to the obligation to bring a matter to
company senior counsel or the CEO; 112 the amount of time

between the discovery of evidence and its disclosure; 113 the
characteristics of appropriate and inappropriate responses to
this disclosure by the CEO or senior company counsel; 114 and the
110 Id.
111 Id. at 71684.
112 The proposed rule defines evidence of a material violation as "information
that would lead an attorney reasonably to believe that a material violation has
occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur." Id. at 71678. The comments to this
proposed rule provide that the objective standard created by this definition does not
require an attorney to believe the information. Thus, even if an attorney
subjectively does not believe the information she has learned or obtained, she must
determine whether the information would 'lead an attorney, acting reasonably, to
believe that the material violation" requires reporting. Id. However, the standard "is
intended to preclude reports based on mere suspicion of a material violation while
providing flexibility to the attorneys when evaluating their reporting obligations."
Id.
The SEC, however, has indicated in the proposed rule that the standard for
making a required report of material violation under section 307 "is not comparable
to a judicial determination that a material violation actually occurred. There must,
however, be some factual basis that would lead an attorney to reasonably believe
that a material violation has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur." Id.
113 The comments in the proposed rule suggests a non-unitary approach:
[Wihen an attorney "becomes aware" of information that would lead an
attorney reasonably to believe in the existence of a material violation
would turn, at least in part, on the attorney's training, experience, position
and seniority. Attorneys are not necessarily expected to identify issues
they are not equipped to see. What the reasonable, experienced securities
lawyer might regard as a clear violation of the law may appear differentor not appear at all-to an unseasoned attorney with a different level of
expertise.
Id.
114 The proposed rule suggests that the SEC will measure the appropriateness
of a response "against an objective reasonableness standard." Id. at 71676. Yet, it
seems that the SEC will flesh this standard out in prosecutions under the rule. "The
Commission's intent is to permit attorneys to exercise their judgment as to whether
a response to a report is appropriate, so long as their determination of what is an
'appropriate response' is objectively reasonable." Id. The comments to the proposed
rule do, however, provide some examples of what could comfortably be considered

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.76:897

amount of time between disclosure to the appropriate official and
115
a response.
There are a host of other problems, many of which are
highlighted in the proposed rules themselves. 116 A significant
problem for the SEC revolves around the scope of the
applicability of section 307. The SEC has taken a very broad
view of who comes within the definition of "attorneys appearing
and practicing before the Commission" under section 307.117
Included in the definition are lawyers preparing or participating
in the preparation of any writing the lawyer has reason to
believe will be filed with or incorporated into a document
submitted to the SEC. 118 Under this definition, it may be
possible to sweep within the ambit of section 307 virtually every
lawyer doing any sort of legal work for a publicly traded
company. Indeed, the SEC meant to sweep with a very broad
brush-including within the definition even foreign attorneys
employed by foreign issuers in foreign jurisdictions. 119 Moreover,
the term "attorney" is defined to include "persons who hold
themselves out as attorneys, even if they are not, in fact,
120
admitted, licensed, or otherwise qualified to practice law."
Combined with the applicability of the rules to foreign

appropriate and inappropriate responses under very basic and extreme fact
circumstances. See id. at 71676-77.
115 Proposed Rule 205.3(b)(4), 67 Fed. Reg. 71686, provides for a response
within a reasonable time. The SEC has solicited comments on the reasonable time
standard, and specifically on setting specific deadlines or deadlines linked to the
complexity of the issues presented in the report. Id. at 205.2(b)(5).
116 For example, the SEC solicited comments to its proposals relating to the
treatment of subordinate attorneys as set forth in proposed rule 205.5. 67 Fed. Reg.
71696. Currently, the proposed rule requires a subordinate attorney to end run his
supervising attorney where the subordinate is dissatisfied with the supervisor's
response to her report, and permits the subordinate to make a noisy withdrawal
under the circumstances in which such withdrawals are generally permitted. See id.
117 The definition in the proposed rule is based on Rule 102(f) and, according to
the SEC, "is consistent with the position the Commission has taken as amicus
curiae in cases involving liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act." 67 Fed.
Reg. 71676. That itself represents an aggressive posture which will likely be tested
in the courts.
118 Id. at 71675. Also included are lawyers advising that any such writing need
not be submitted to the SEC or that an issuer is not required to make any
submission to the SEC. Id.
119 See id. at 71676. The SEC, aware of the breadth of its definition, sought
comments about the value of applying the reporting requirements of section 307 to
foreign lawyers and other affected foreign professionals. See id. at 71676-78.
120 Id. at 71677.
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practitioners, the proposed rule would include within its ambit
foreign notaries and others who, in civil and other non-common
law systems, perform work traditionally characterized as legal
work in the United States. It is not clear that Congress meant to
bring these actors within the requirements of the Act. On the
other hand, to the extent that the Act was meant to compel
people performing work characterized as "lawyer's work" in the
United States, and to the extent that Congress expected the Act
to have broad extra-territorial effect, then including civil law
notaries and other such professionals within the reporting
requirements of section 307 might be consistent with the
broadest outlines of the Act. Whatever the resolution of these
ambiguities and problems in the regulations, the statutory
commands under section 307 itself presents a number of traps
for the unwary. An interesting potential trap for the unwary is
found in the definition section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The
securities laws are now defined to include the provisions of the
Sarbanes-OxleyAct. 121 As such, among those activities that
lawyers must bring to the attention of the company are failures
by company lawyers to comply with their reporting obligations
under section 307. Lawyers now have both a duty to report, if
they fall within the ambit of section 307, and must report
"material evidence" of the violation of the reporting obligations
under section 307 of other lawyers.
Additionally, neither the statute nor the proposed rules
consider the extent to which knowledge can be imputed within
law firms. It is possible for courts reasonably to take the
position that law firms, especially law firms with securities
practices, are responsible as a whole, for the obligations of its
employees-whether partners or employees. 122 If that is the
case, then law firms might now be well advised to put in place
systems of internal control and information sharing mechanisms
that have had to be developed by public companies after In re
121 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 2(b), 116 Stat. 745,
749 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47)).
122 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for sanctions assessment
against lawyers and their law firms jointly, absent exceptional circumstances. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(A). On the other hand, section 307, unlike the civil
procedure rules, do not explicitly provide for firm wide joint responsibility. On that
basis, liability may be limited to the individuals who are found to have committed
the violation. Cf Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989)
(1983 form of Rule 11 did not permit firm sanctions for individual misconduct).
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Caremark, and implemented now in light of the certification
requirements of section 302 of the Act. 1 23 Moreover, it is unclear
the extent to which the reporting rules under section 307 impact
the rules in many states which provide a mechanism under
which corporate fiduciaries can avoid liability for garden variety
breaches of the duty of care-for example, under the provisions
of Delaware Code section 102(b)(7). 124 The proposed rule does
not clarify the matter.
Section 205.2(d) defines breach of
fiduciary duty as a "breach of fiduciary duty recognized at
common law" but is silent with respect to the effects, if any, of
125
state exculpatory rules.
It is possible that the failure to make appropriate efforts to
discover and report under the new standards, or to correctly
determine whether the initial response by corporate counsel or
the CEO was appropriate, might lead to civil liability for the
lawyer with the section 307 obligation. Three sources of liability
come to mind: (1) malpractice; (2) violation of state professional
responsibility rules; and (3) civil liability with respect to the
quality of section 307 reporting itself.
It is important to mention the possibilities for state law
professional discipline even though I would concede that the
likelihood of discipline, even under the theory I propose here, is
unlikely at best. The failure to comply with the reporting
requirements of section 307 might constitute an act of
malpractice.
Let me suggest one basis-lack of legal
competence. The duty to report imposed by section 307 may
imply a certain level of legal competence. The idea that the basic
skills of lawyers representing corporations ought to include some
123 Some in the legal academy suggest that any such project will be difficult for
law firms. See Coffee, supra note 89, at 1418 ("Whatever the control problems with
accounting firms, law firms have nothing even remotely approaching the substantial
system of internal controls employed by audit firms.").
124DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2002). This provision, similar to
provisions in most other states, permits a corporation to amend its articles of
incorporation to eliminate or limit the personal liability of directors for most forms
of breaches of the duty of care. While the exact extent of the power to eliminate
liability in this regard varies from state to state, the provisions permit a fairly broad
exculpation clause to be built into the basic governance structure of any corporation.
No such provision permits eliminating liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty.
See James J. Hanks, Jr., EvaluatingRecent State Legislation on Directorand Officer
Liability Limitationand Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207 (1988).
125 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71670, 71678 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205)
(commenting on proposed Rule 205.2(d)).
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minimum level of familiarity with the accounting field has been
renewed with some force after the Enron scandals. 126 A lawyer
without sufficient skills to reasonably identify "material
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar
violation" under section 307 might be deemed to act with
127
sufficient recklessness that malpractice liability might attach,
even under the normally protective rules of malpractice law. 128
In addition, to the extent that failure to comply with the new
section 307 reporting rules will in the future constitute violation
of state professional responsibility rules, the lawyer will face
additional problems. Failure to comply with the section 307
reporting requirement might constitute grounds for lawyer
discipline. State discipline would complement the new power of
the SEC to censure under section 602 of the Act. Indeed,
censure or other action against a lawyer by the SEC could well
serve as evidence creating a presumption of the commission of an
act subjecting the lawyer to discipline.
But compliance might also generate problems for lawyers
subject to section 307. The fear of malpractice liability might
encourage conduct that, itself, will create the potential for
lawyer civil liability. Both the lower evidentiary standard
triggering reporting ("evidence of material violation") and the
post-facto determination by the SEC of violation might make
lawyers cautious about their approach to reporting. Lawyers
might then tend to over-report rather than under-report
"evidence." They might also tend to deem a lower rather than a
higher quantum of "evidence" sufficient to meet the reporting
126 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business
Lawyers in Enron'sDark Shadows, 57 BUS. LAW. 1421, 1449-54 (2002).
127 In this sense, even good faith defenses might be insufficient to protect a
lawyer who seeks to excuse her breach of any section 307 obligation on the grounds
that she was unaware that particular events are somehow "material evidence"
subject to reporting under section 307. Essentially, section 307 might be a vehicle
for the heightening of the standard for liability under state professional
responsibility rules. Professor Cunningham suggests that the threat of malpractice
in this area generally has posed little threat to lawyers and relies instead on ethical
and prudential arguments. See id. at 1452 ("Failure to master accounting matters,
even in the intersection of law and accounting, is less likely to result in successful
malpractice claims. For these, a good defense would be the hardy 'mere error of
judgment' doctrine, strong so long as a lawyer can show good faith."). Section 307
obligations might make a good faith showing harder to sustain.
128 For other suggestions of liability for malpractice under the Act, see, for
example, Martha Neil, Rule on Reporting Wrongs Stirs Debate, 37 A.B.A. J. EReport 8 (Sept. 27, 2002), available at WL 37 ABAJEREP 8.
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requirements of section 307.129 But overzealousness, and the
resulting overreporting, might itself lead to liability where such
reporting, if ultimately determined not to reveal any breach,
causes loss to the company. The comments to the proposed
rules, however, emphasize the SEC's understanding that section
307, standing alone, does not create a "private right of action
against an attorney." 130 This last potential basis of civil liability
suggests another basis of exposure. This source of liability
would be based on the way in which the reporting requirements
of sections 307 and 404 might work together to produce liability
for both lawyers and accountants. 31 The Act does not explain
the relationship between the reporting system created under
section 307 and the requirement of section 404 for the
preparation, testing, and disclosure of management's internal
control report. Under rules to be created by the SEC, section 404
will impose on companies the obligation to create and report on
their internal control structure and procedures for financial
reporting. Reporting companies will also have to assess the
effectiveness of the internal control structure, while accounting
firms providing services to the company will have to attest to
and report on management's assessment of the internal
controls.132 In effect, it might be possible for both management
and auditors, in the course of preparing, reviewing, and
certifying a section 404 report, to review and pass on the quality
and sufficiency of a lawyer's reporting obligations under section
307. In this context, the company and its auditors might have
to, in order to meet their obligations, provide the evidence
necessary to establish grounds for liability on the part of lawyers

129 Whether or not section 307 reports are subject to analysis and disclosure by
management and a company's outside auditors under the requirements of section
404 of the Act, the disclosure requirements of Regulation S-K may require, or at
least strongly counsel for, disclosure of section 307 reports when the company
reasonably concludes that a government investigation is likely. See 17 C.F.R. §
229.103 (2002).
130 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71670, 71697 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205)
(commenting on proposed Rule 205.6). The comment cites to statements made by
Senator Edwards, 148 Cong. Rec. S6552, and Senator Enzi, id. at S6555, in support
of its understanding.
131 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745,
789 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b)).
132 Stephen J. Crimmins et al., Sweeping Securities Law Reform Affects Issuers,
Officers, and Directors, 169 N.J.L.J. 729 (2002).
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to third parties affected by the section 307 disclosures.
There is another wrinkle: the Act is not clear about the
relationship between the section 307 requirements and the
protections afforded under the section 806 whistleblower
provisions, discussed in greater detail in the section that
follows. 133 Section 806 extends protection to employees of a
company
against
retaliation
under
certain
specified
circumstances. Only certain named parties, however, are subject
to the prohibitions of new section 806, including employers and
their agents. 3 4 As such, whistleblower protection may not
extend to actions commenced by a third party, unrelated to the
employer or its agents, for acts undertaken as an employee. The
encouragement of reporting under section 307 should not be read
as encouragement of reckless or negligent over-reporting which
results in damage to the company. Consequently, statutes that
protect employees reporting wrongdoing should not protect the
wrongdoing of the reporting employees as against third partiesparticularly shareholders, and perhaps even the creditors of the
corporation.
On the other hand, a broader reading of the
whistleblower provisions might lead to a different result. If the
purpose of the protection is to encourage reporting, then
employee liability based on that reporting would seem to create
disincentives to robust reporting under section 307. Since the
disclosure of section 307 reporting may be a function of a
company's obligations under section 404, as overseen by the
company's outside auditors, it would be plausible that any
damage alleged was not caused by the reporting employee, but
rather by the reporting company and its auditors. As such, the
employee should escape liability to third parties, at least in
circumstances in which the section 307 reporting might be
covered by the whistleblower protections of section 806 with
135
respect to employer action.
For a more detailed discussion of the new section 806, see infra section 6.
The entities subject to the prohibitions of the whistleblower provisions
include any "company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is required to file reports
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), or any
officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company." SarbanesOxley Act § 806 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)).
135 Of course, the circumstances under which this may occur may be quite
limited, given the potential narrowness of the application of the protection of the
whistleblower provision. See discussion infra section 7.
133
134
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Section 307 of the Act thus presents any number of
uncertainties. Perhaps the greatest long term uncertainty of the
reporting requirement itself is its relationship to state rules of
professional conduct. 136 To some extent, the Act represents the
first, if limited, attempt by the federal government to regulate
lawyers. The federalism and comity implications of this sort of
regulation have yet to be worked out. On one hand, this may
represent a targeted intervention; on the other hand, it may
represent the first step toward the creation of a federal or
national bar and the bifurcation of the bar between state and
federal practitioners.
The SEC itself, in promulgating the
proposed rules implementing standards of professional conduct
for attorneys, announced that it might "at some future date
supplement or amend this rule to expand its scope and address
additional ethical issues that are relevant to practice before the
Commission." 137 This echoes a strain of argument that has been
gathering force within the country for a number of years urging
at least a partial federalization of attorney regulation and
practice. 138 Though the SEC goes to some lengths to deny that it
will "propose to create an 'SEC Bar' with admission
requirements, of which attorneys must be members to appear or
practice before the Commission," 139 the SEC embraces its
authority to "police the behavior of practitioners appearing
before it." 140 I am not sure that the distinction the SEC makes
has any practical difference in effect on those who must practice
before it. Moreover, the SEC speaks only of not supplanting
state ethics laws "unnecessarily, particularly in areas (e.g.,
safeguarding of client assets, escrow procedures, advertising)
where the Commission lacks expertise."' 4 '
The SEC has
See supra note 84 and accompanying discussion.
See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67
Fed. Reg. 71670, 71674-71675, 71696-71698 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
138 See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, FederalizingLegal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335
(1994) (considering creation of federal code of legal ethics for the regulation of
lawyers). Some have suggested the creation of a federal bar. See, e.g., Stephen B.
Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and
Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 974 (1992).
139 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 71675.
140 Id. (quoting Polydoroffv. ICC, 773 F.2d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). For the
SEC, section 307 of the Act confirms this regulatory authority. Id.
136

137

141 Id.

at 71673.

FEDERALIZING NORMS

2002]

reserved for itself, however, the right to consider "whether
Congress intended for the agency's rule to 'occupy the field' on
this issue [the up-the-ladder-reporting-system], and whether
part 205 would preempt any state rules governing the reporting
of evidence of a material violation by attorneys representing
1 42
issuers before the Commission.
Whatever the SEC will call its intervention in the
regulation of lawyer ethics, the result might well be another step
toward the creation of a bifurcated bar, as traditionally
understood, with elite lawyers licensed or regulated under
federal law and others the subject of more parochial state
regulation. The SEC has made its own pro-federalization view
clear enough on this score: "Commission preemption of any state
ethical rules as topics covered by Part 205 would have the
salutary benefit of creating a single uniform standard which
attorneys in all jurisdictions must satisfy; and it would also
resolve the dilemma faced by attorneys who practice in multiple
jurisdictions."1 43 It is ironic that this process appears to have
gained some impetus at the time when the sitting president and
the political party controlling the House of Representatives have
both characterized their political philosophy as favoring
144
devolution of federal power to the states.
6.

What if the person who is suspicious of the senior
management is an officer, what should he or she do? Does
reportingthe possible illegalityprotect them? Does it matter
what level employee reports, e.g., officer versus stock room
clerk?

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides enhanced protection for
whistleblowers. 145 The new section 806 provides protection for
142

Id. at 71697.

Id. For arguments supporting the creation of a federal securities bar, see
Ann Maxey, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Securities Lawyers: New Remedies
vs. Old Policies, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 537, 578-585 (1997).
144 The Republican Party, in particular, has taken a position in favor of
devolution of authority to states and the private sector as a matter of party policy at
least since before the 1994 congressional elections. For a discussion of the
Republican position on federalism and states rights, see, for example, REPUBLICAN
143

NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT
GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE

NATION (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
145 Section 806 of the Act adds 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
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employees who act as whistleblowers in a corporation subject to
federal securities laws reporting requirements. 146 The new
section prohibits a corporation "or any officer, employee,
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company," from
discharging, demoting, suspending, harassing, or discriminating
against any employee for whistleblowing. 147 Any action by a
whistleblower must "be commenced not later than 90 days after
the date on which the violation occurs" by filing a complaint with
the Secretary of Labor. 148 An officer, as an employee of the
issuer, should be protected like any other employee under the
whistleblowing provisions. This would be consistent with the
approach of modern corporate statutes, such as the RMBCA,
which distinguishes between directors and officers in part
because of the employee status of officers, but imposes similar
fiduciary duties on both. 149 Because officers are burdened,
however, with fiduciary duties to corporations substantially
similar to those of directors, as a result of officers not being
"ordinary" employees, an argument could be made that the
whistleblowing protections ought not to extend to them. This
argument, however, defies the intent of whistleblowing
provisions to encourage disclosure.
The more interesting question involves the directors.
Whistleblowing provisions do not cover non-employee directors.
146 18 U.S.C. § 1514A applies only to companies with a class of securities
registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act or companies required to file
reports under section 15(d) of the Exchange Act. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806(a), 116 Stat. 745, 802-03 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1514A(a)).
147 Id. § 806 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A). Acts constituting protected
whistleblowing are described in section 806(a)(1). In order to be protected the
employee must have a reasonable belief that the information she provides, or causes
to be provided, constitutes a violation of federal shareholder anti-fraud laws and the
information is provided only to the classes of individuals identified in the statute.
Failure to meet any of these requirements results in a loss of protection under this
provision. The courts are likely to have to clarify the standards used to assess an
employee's reasonable belief as well as the circumstances under which the provision
of information is delivered to the statutorily designated individuals. Id.
148 See id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A)) (a person seeking
protection under the whistleblower provisions must file a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor); id. § 806(b)(2)(D) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D))
(stating that action must be commenced within 90 days of the date on which the
violation occurs).
149 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42 (Comm. on Corp. Law of the section of
Bus. Law of the A.B.A. 1994) (official comment) ("[Elvery corporate officer or agent
owes duties of fidelity, honesty, good faith, and fair dealing to the corporation.").
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Yet, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act appears to impose greater
regulation on the specifics of behavior deemed minimally
necessary to comply with directors' duties of care. It is not clear,
however, that the Act has substantially altered the substance of
director fiduciary duties in general, except to the extent of
adding detail (and thus limiting discretion) with respect to
certain conduct. The core of the new requirements with respect
to certification and reporting apply to officers, not directors. 150
But the same cannot be said with respect to the duties and
obligations of those members of the board of directors that form
the audit committee. Indeed, the greatest level of change applies
to audit committee directors. 151 Among the most important new
roles for the audit committees of a corporation whose shares
trade on national stock exchanges are the creation and
maintenance of procedures for receiving, retaining, and
investigating complaints regarding accounting, internal controls,
and auditing matters. 152 This provision requires the national
150 The principal new certifications with respect to a company's reports and
internal controls under section 302 of the Act apply only to the designated corporate
officers, and not to the board of directors as a body. The same is true of the periodic
certifications of financial reports under section 906. See supra notes 33-45
(discussing the new certification and reporting requirements).
151 The members of the audit committee are now subject to a number of duties.
They include the obligation to review action deemed inappropriate in the context of
section 307 reports of material violations of the securities laws. See Sarbanes-Oxley
Act § 307(2) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 7245) (requiring report to the audit
committee, or another committee composed solely of independent directors or the
entire board of directors). In addition, the audit committee is responsible for
determining the propriety of approving the provision of certain non-audit services
by the corporation's auditors. See id. § 201(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a))
(amending section 10A of the Exchange Act). The audit committee is now also
specifically charged with the management of the corporation's external auditors. See
id. § 204 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (amending section 10A of the Exchange
Act by adding new section (k) requiring the auditor to report to the audit committee
all critical accounting policies and practices to be used, all alternative treatments of
financial information that have been discussed with management, and all other
material written communications with management). The Exchange Act is also
amended by defining a corporation's audit committee as the committee charged with
oversight of the corporation's accounting and financial reporting processes or the
entire board of directors if no such committee is constituted. Id. § 205 (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78c) (amending section 3(a) of the Exchange Act by adding new
subsection (a)(58)).
152 See id. § 301 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (amending section 10A of
the Exchange Act by adding new section (m)(4)). The audit committee must
establish procedures for the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints received
by the company with respect to accounting, internal accounting controls or auditing
matters and must provide for "the confidential and anonymous submission by
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exchanges to adopt rules prohibiting the listing of any securities
of an issuer that does not constitute an audit committee with the
authority over audit and financial affairs specified in that
section. 153 Moreover, corporations subject to the audit committee
rules of section 301 (all companies whose securities trade on
national securities or otherwise traded by national securities
associations) may not appoint inside directors to the audit
committee, 154 and must provide "appropriate funding, as
determined by the audit committee," for payment to outside
auditors and the advisors hired by the audit committee. 155
Corporations are also given substantial incentives to appoint at
least one member to the audit committee who is a financial
156
expert.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has potentially far reaching effects
on state corporate law. In particular, the new rules, to the
extent they create federal civil and criminal rules of fiduciary
duty of care, seem to override state corporate law provisions
permitting corporations to opt out of liability for duty of care
violations committed by directors-for example, Delaware Code
section 102(b)(7). 157 At its narrowest, it has certainly created an
exception to the applicability of the exculpatory rules by
effectively doing away with them for public corporations to the
extent specified in the Act. Moreover, the Act seems to open the
door to the creation of additional sources of duty on the part of
corporate managers. Section 307 of the Act speaks of a duty to
report material violations of the securities laws, fiduciary duty

employees of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters." Id.
153Id. § 301 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (amending section 10A of the
Exchange Act by adding new section (m)(1)(A)). The duties and obligations of the
audit committee are specified in subsections (m)(2) through (m)(6). In addition to
the obligations described supra, note 151, these duties include responsibility for the
appointment, compensation and oversight of the outside auditor, and the authority
to engage outside advisors.
154 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(m)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
155 Id. § 301(m)(6).
156 Id. § 407 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265). This provision empowers the
SEC to require corporations to disclose whether or not the audit committee includes
a financial expert, and if not, the reasons why no such expert is a member of the
audit committee. Clearly, the intent is to create incentives through disclosure, for
corporations to appoint such experts and avoid the potential embarrassment of
having to offer an excuse for a failure to appoint such an expert other than a
temporary vacancy.
157 See supra note 124.
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"or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof."158 At
its broadest, however, the Act may represent a profound change
in the willingness of the federal government to intrude on state
prerogatives with respect to the fundamentals of corporate
governance. Here is an example of how the federal securities
laws continue to eat away at the scope and effectiveness of state
corporate law, at least with respect to publicly held companies.
Can federal corporate law be far behind?
The actual protections afforded to whistleblowers under the
Act are tricky and present several traps for the unwary. Under
the terms of that provision, no public company subject to its
provisions or its agents may "discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against
an employee" of a company for whistleblowing.' 59 There are a
number of interesting parts to this protection. The protection is
limited to certain broadly defined conduct related to
investigations of fraudulent conduct against shareholders, 60 and
by a reasonable belief standard.' 6' Moreover the conduct is
protected only if the information is provided to the employee's
supervisors, federal officials, or members of Congress. 162
These provisions raise a number of issues. Perhaps the
courts will rely on judicial interpretation of and developments in
connection with other whistleblower provisions. 163 Among the
158 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307(1). The proposed rule does little to elaborate on
this new category of violation. All the comment suggests is that "it appears from the
context in which it is used in section 307, that the term is intended to extend beyond
a breach of fiduciary duty or a violation of the securities laws." Implementation of
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71679
(proposed Nov. 21, 2002) (comment to proposed Rule 205.2(i)). It is likely that the
Congress meant to express an intention to sweep broadly when it inserted this
phrase. But statutes are not the best place in which to make a gesture. This gesture
in particular will have to be given concrete effect in law. A likely candidate for
inclusion in such a category of "other" are violations of anti-discrimination laws
applicable to corporations. See Holley v. Crank, 258 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
granted sub nom. Meyer v. Holley, 122 S. Ct. 1959 (2002) (direct liability of
corporate shareholder for corporate violation of federal Fair Housing Act).
159 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)).
160 Id.
§ 806(a)(1) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)) ("to provide
information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an
investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes

constitutes a violation .....

See id.
Id. § 806(a)(1), (2) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1), (2)).
13 Many states, as well as the federal government, have enacted statutes
designed to protect against retaliatory discharge in a whistleblower context. Federal
161
162
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issues that await resolution, perhaps one of the most important
is the character of the reasonable belief standard. The Act does
not make clear whether a subjective or objective standard is to
be used. Given the embrace of objective standards throughout
the SEC's proposed rule under section 307, however, 164 it is
likely that an objective standard, and perhaps one tied more or
less strongly to context, will emerge.
Moreover, the statute creates some traps for the unwary
For example, an employee that conveys the
employee.
information to the press or inferior employees may not be subject
to the protection of the Act, since these groups are not included
within the class of persons to which information may be
conveyed. If the information conveyed is not connected to the
violations referenced in the Act, the conveyance of that
information, including perhaps otherwise confidential business
information which might, after the fact, not be deemed to
constitute information relating to a covered violation, would not
be protected by the Act. Moreover, the affected employee must
file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within "90 days after
the date on which the violation occurs."1 65 Failure to meet this
requirement, like similar failures in the context of race and sex
and therefore
discrimination, may have jurisdictional,
preclusive, effect. 166 One can speculate that this very short
statutes contain a number of provisions for protection of employees who disclose
employer wrongdoing. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2622
(2000); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 §507, 33 U.S.C. §
1367; Safe Drinking Water Act §1450(i), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (2000); Energy
Reorganization Act of 1977 §211, 42 U.S.C. § 5851; Solid Waste Disposal Act § 1002,
42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2000); Clean Air Act § 322(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (2000);
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 § 110, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9610. For state law provisions, see, for example, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m
(West 2002) (protection of employee who discloses employer's illegal activities or
unethical practices); N.J. Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:19-1 (West 2002) (protection in disclosure of corrupt, illegal, fraudulent, or
harmful activity); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney & Supp. 1986) (prohibiting
retaliatory personnel action by employers). See generally Trystan Phifer O'Leary,
Note, Silencing the Whistleblower: The Gap Between Federal and State Retaliatory
DischargeLaws, 85 IOWA L. REV. 663 (2000).
164 See supra notes 81-144 and accompanying text.
codified at 18 U.S.C.
165 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(b)(2)(D) (to be
§ 1514A(b)(2)(D)).
166 It has long been held that the complaint filing requirements have a
jurisdictional effect. See, e.g., Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972); Evans
v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1996); Lowe v. City
of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 1986); cf Charles C. Jackson & John H.
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statute of limitations will operate as a fairly effective trap for the
unwary. Many employees otherwise entitled to protection will
find themselves unable to rely on the protection of the SarbanesOxley Act for waiting too long to assert their rights.
In the case of the marginal employee-the employee in
danger of dismissal for other reasons on the eve of a protected
disclosure-, however, the rules may have a temporary positive
effect. I suspect that the disclosure will temper any decision to
dismiss the employee immediately, but where companies will be
able to prove that the primary motivation in dismissal was
unsatisfactory performance occurring prior to the protected
activity, the company may still be able to successfully dismiss
the employee.
I also suspect that discrimination and
whistleblower jurisprudence in other acts will have a substantial
impact on the way this provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is
interpreted.
There is one caveat: It is not clear whether section 806's
whistleblower provisions protect employees other than those of
the reporting company. 167 It is clear from the provision's text
that in-house lawyers and financial staff are covered.
Nonetheless, outside law firm partners and associates, even
those with reporting obligations under section 307, or partners
and subordinate members of an audit team, even those with
evaluation obligations under section 404, who provide
information of the type contemplated by section 806 of the Act,
do not appear to be covered under the terms of the Act. Indeed,
the SEC, in proposing its rules under section 307 of the Act,
solicited comments with respect to the need to extend application
of the whistleblower provisions of section 806 at least to
attorneys required to disclose information to the Commission

Matheson, The Continuing Violation Theory and the Concept of Jurisdiction in Title
VII Suits, 67 GEo. L.J. 811, 811 (1979) (concluding "that the Title VII filing
requirement is not a jurisdictional absolute, but should instead be treated like a
statute of limitations").
167 The provision clearly covers employees of the publicly traded companies
subject to the act-that is, companies with a class of securities registered under
section 12 of the Exchange Act, or that are required to file reports under section
15(d) of the Exchange Act. The provision makes it clear that the agents and
subcontractors of the company may not retaliate against the whistleblowing

employee of the issuer, but appears to mention no equivalent protection for
employees of the subcontractor or other third party. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act
§ 806(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)).
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under the proposed rule. 168 In the absence of direct statutory
coverage, all such employees will have to rely on other statutory
protections under federal or state law 169 to the extent those
protections may be available. 170 There is some legislative history
supporting this result.171
Despite the argument from the black letter of the provision,
it may be possible to interpret the provision more broadly to
cover non-issuer employees. First, it is possible to read the
provision as requiring coverage of all employees of the issuer and
its agents. The statute prohibits Exchange Act companies, or
reporting companies under section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, "or
any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such
company," to "discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or
172
in any other manner discriminate against an employee.... "
If employees of the issuer were to be covered exclusively, the
statute would have had to be written to provide that the
prohibition applies to employees of the company. But it does not.
It follows that the word "employee" must refer to employees of
the company and employees of the contractors, subcontractors,
or agents of the company.
Second, a strong argument can be made on the basis of
policy and the need to interpret the provision in line with
Congress's intent in enacting the provision. The Act institutes a
fairly integrated system of disclosure centered on accounting and
financial matter, including mandatory disclosure and analysis of
168 67 Fed. Reg. 71693. Proposed Rule 205.3(e), 67 Fed. Reg. 71692, would

permit disclosure of client information under certain circumstances.
169 See supra note 163. The coverage of these statutes is uneven at best. See,
e.g., O'Leary, supra note 163, at 663. For a discussion of general whistleblower
provisions in federal and state law, see, for example, Elletta Sangrey Callahan &
Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. Bus.
L.J. 99 (2000); Michael Kane, Whistleblowers: Are They Protected?,20 OHIO N.U. L.
REV.1007 (1994).
170 Section 806(d) provides that "[niothing in this section shall be deemed to
diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any employee under any Federal or
State law, or under any collective bargaining agreement." Sarbanes-Oxley Act §
806(d) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(d)).

171For example, Senator Snowe stated, "[Tihe Leahy Amendment grants
important whistleblower protections to company employees-like Enron's Sherron
Watkins-who bravely report wrongdoing occurring within their own corporation."
148 CONG. REC. S6734, S6761 (2002) (statement of Sen. Snowe). Senator Boxer

noted that the provision "protects whistleblowers who reveal unethical acts by the
companies for which they work." 148 CONG. REC. S6734, S6759 (2002) (statement by
Sen. Boxer).
172 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(a) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)).
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internal systems of disclosure on the part of an issuer's outside
auditors and lawyers. Therefore, it could be argued that the
term "employee," as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, includes the
employees of the agents and sub-contractors of the issuer to the
extent they are performing work for the benefit of the issuer (and
issuer's security holders). Such a construction would not be
unreasonable and comports with the broad remedial purposes of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
7.

The Act seems to be internally inconsistent with respect to the
length of time that the auditors are supposed to retain work
papers. In one partof the Act it says five years and in
another seven? What would you advise auditors to do?
There are a number of inconsistencies in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. Section 103(a)(2)(A)(i) provides that the Board require
registered public accounting firms to prepare and maintain audit
work papers and other documents related to any audit report for
at least seven years. 17 3 In contrast, the Corporate Criminal
Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, section 802 of the SarbanesOxley Act, 174 requires that "[any accountant who conducts an
audit of an issuer of securities to which section 1OA(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j-1(a)) applies,
shall maintain all audit or review work papers for a period of 5
years from the end of the fiscal period in which the audit or
review was concluded."1 75 The easy answer here is for auditing
firms to maintain the appropriate work papers for the longer of
176
the two periods. The Act provisions contemplate this result.
173 See id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(i) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(i))
("prepare, and maintain for a period of not less than 7 years, audit work papers, and
other information related to any audit report .. ").
Section 105 of the Act provides
the Board with authority to sanction violations of this retention rule. Id. § 105(c)(4)
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4)). The sanctions include suspension or
revocation of registration, temporary or permanent bar of any person from
associating with a registered auditing firm, limitations on the activities of such
person or firm, monetary fines, censure, and required professional training. Id.
174 Id. § 802 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1501).
175 Id. § 802(a)(1) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1)). Knowing and willful
violation of this provision can result in fines or imprisonment for no more than ten
years. Id. § 802(b).
176 Thus, section 802(c) provides that the five year retention provisions of the
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 do not "diminish or
relieve any person of any other duty or obligation imposed by Federal or State
law . . . ." In this case, the requirements of a seven-year retention period fall within
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There are other silences in the Act as well. For example, it
is not clear that the provisions of sections 103(a)(2)(A)(i) or 802
apply to management internal review practices which
177
accountants must review pursuant to section 404 of the Act.
Section 404 requires "each registered public accounting firm that
prepares or issues" an issuer's audit report to "attest to, and
report on, the assessment made by the management of the
issuer" with respect to the issuer's internal control structure and
procedures for financial reporting, as well as the effectiveness of
these systems. 178 Reading the Act requirements broadly and
with its remedial intent in mind, it would be reasonable to
conclude that an auditor's internal control evaluation and
reporting might well constitute "audit work papers and other
documents related to any audit report" subject to the seven year
retention rule of section 103(a)(2)(A)(i). The auditor's section 404
work might also constitute "audit or review work papers" within
the meaning of section 802, and thus subject both to the five-year
retention rule and its criminal penalties. It is likely that the
work product produced by the auditors is meant to be covered
under either or both. The better course for the client seeking
practical advice, for the moment at least, is to err on the side of
preservation.
8.

The Act provides criminalpenaltiesfor certain wrongdoing
by senior management and others. The wrongful conduct
ranges deal with financialstatement certification and
document destruction. Each of the provisions requires
knowledge or intentional violation. Are these penaltieslikely
to deter wrongful behavior? Do these penalties (and the other
provisions of this Act) get us to the point where we are
treatingwhite-collar crime as similar to other crimes? Do we
have a different standardof morality for white-collar crime
than we do for street crime?
Discussions about criminalizing conduct, especially conduct

the obligations of registered auditing firms to the Board, while the five-year
retention rules are general requirements applicable to any accountant and overseen
by the SEC.
177 For a discussion of section 404, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying
text.
178 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404(b) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b)).
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related to economic activity, tends to progress along fairly well
worn lines. 179 What has been new in the area is the explicit
recognition of class, status, race, and ethnicity issues in
connection with the punishment of crime.1 80
The criminal
provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act again raise the core policy
issues of the utility of criminalization to deter behavior deemed
obnoxious (or worse), and the tension between equal treatment of
criminals and proportionality of punishment. On the one hand,
there is a logic and a sense of fairness in the notion that a
criminal from the lowest socio-economic rung or, from racial or
ethnic groups traditionally marginalized in this country, ought
to be treated no differently than those from the highest reaches
of the socio-economic elite.' 8 ' The former controlling members of
Adelphia, John Rigas and his sons, should face the same type of
punishment as an impoverished bank teller for crimes of similar
magnitude. The problem, of course, remains the meaning of
"similar." While some argue that similar in this context means
"the same effect"-equal prison terms and equal treatment in all
other respects, 8 2 others suggest that where the positions of the
179 Kip Schlegel et al., Are White-Collar Crimes Overcriminalized? Some
Evidence on the Use of CriminalSanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 117, 117-18 (2000-2001) (much of the relevant literature is cited in notes 14). As the authors of a recent empirical study of the effects of the criminalization of
securities laws violations so well put it:
Since Edwin H. Sutherland first coined the term "white-collar crime" to
describe those harmful business behaviors that, in his estimation, were not
being punished either criminally or severely enough, there have been
countless discussions and diatribes regarding the merits of defining such
behaviors as criminal, how to define the concept, and how such behavior
should be socially controlled.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
180 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795
(1998) (discussing the "racial tilts" resulting from drug enforcement strategies
focusing on poor urban neighborhoods); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Devastating
Impact of the Justice System on the Status of African-American Males: An Overview
Perspective, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 23, 26 (1994) (discussing the "correlation between
the plight of African-American males and their treatment by our justice system");
Laura A. Wytsma, Comment, Punishment for "Just Us"--A ConstitutionalAnalysis
of the Crack Cocaine Sentencing Statutes, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 473, 474
(1995) (analyzing "the development of the racially biased crack sentencing laws").
181See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995) (arguing that the race of a
black defendant is sometimes an appropriate factor for jurors to consider).
182 Compare Darryl K Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the
Contingency of CriminalLiability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1316-24 (2001) (arguing
that the punishment of street criminals ought to be grounded on the same principles

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.76:897

criminals are different, imposing punishment equal in outward
form results in the imposition of disproportionate punishment.
People taking the latter position tend to view proportionality as
the touchstone for equivalence. 183
For them, imposing
proportionally equal sentences furthers justice. If a person with
no social or economic status loses, jail may be appropriate. The
equivalent punishment for a member of a socio-economic elite
might be the permanent prospective denial of elite status by
effectively taking away the status and wealth of the person to be
punished. Thus, for example, forcing the Rigas family to assume
positions as part of the lower middle class and requiring them to
work hourly jobs for their livelihood might be equivalent to the
imposition of a jail sentence on the penniless thief.
But, putting questions of the philosophy of criminal law
aside, a close examination reveals that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
added little in the way of criminal liability. True enough, section
906 carries criminal liability in cases of egregious violation 184
and other existing criminal penalties have been expanded; 185
however, on the whole, relatively little has changed. In this
respect, the trend to federalize criminal provisions continues. 186
If that is the case, then perhaps the importance of the
criminal provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act lie elsewhere. A
clue can be gleaned from the prior discussion. The focus on
white-collar criminality in this context tends to be parochial, and
and forms of prosecutorial conduct as are applied to the punishment of white collar
criminals), with Kyron Huigens, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and Theories of
Punishment: A Response to Brown, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2002) (proposing

alternatively a "virtue-ethics" theory of punishment).
183 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals:
A Proposalfor Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365,
366 (1999) (discussing shaming as an alternative to short terms of imprisonment for
white collar criminals).
184 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906(c), 116 Stat. 745,
806 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350). If the certifying officer knows that the
financial report "does not comport with all of the [section's] requirements," then he
may be fined up to $1,000,000 and/or imprisoned for up to 10 years. See id.
§ 906(c)(1). If the certifying officer "willfully certifies" the report knowing that it
"does not comport with" the section's requirements, then he may be fined up to
$5,000,000 and/or imprisoned for up to 20 years. See id. § 906(c)(2).
185 See id. § 1106 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78fMa)) ((1) changing the
$1,000,000 fine to $5,000,000 and raising the 10 years imprisonment term to 20
years and (2) increasing the $2,500,000 fine to $25,000,000).
186 See, e.g., Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalizationof CriminalLaw:
Sounding the Alarm or "Crying Wolf'?, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2000)
(discussing the acceleration of the federalization trend in the past 20 to 30 years).
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perhaps necessarily so. The concentration will be on the pool of
potential perpetrators, their victims, and other pools of criminals
potentially similarly situated. But I suggest that much of the
thrust of the criminal provisions not be directed toward either
the criminal or her victims. Instead, I would posit a much
broader perspective within which to view the utility of the
Seemingly, the criminal
criminal provisions of the Act.
provisions of the Act were directed at three primary and two
secondary communities. The political benefits of the Act, both to
the business and political communities in the United States,
might be significantly greater, in the long term, than the
benefits gained through the application of the criminal
provisions to selected members of the American business classes.
The first is the domestic political community. The integrity
of the public securities markets was compromised by the
scandals. These scandals reached right to the top of the political
The American financial system is based on an
elite. 8 7
acceptance of the "facts" of transparent and liquid markets in
which all traders are engaged in the market with equal
information and the information fairly represents the relative
condition of all market issuers. 188 The principles were nicely
189
summarized by Justice Ginsburg in United States v. O'Hagan,
where she identified "an animating purpose of the Exchange Act:
to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote
investor confidence.' 9 0 There was a fear that confidence in the
187 Both Vice President Richard Cheney and the former Chair of the Securities
Exchange Commission, Harvey Pitt, were well acquainted with many of the
corporate villains who emerged in 2000-2002, and they were rumored to have some
peripheral involvement with the scandals. See, e.g., Kathleen Day, Harvey Pitt
Raises A Promotion Commotion, WASH. POST, July 25, 2002, at El; James Grimaldi,
Asbestos Claims Hurt Halliburton Insurance Spinoff Lawyers Ask Whether Parent
Company Hid Information During Cheney's Watch, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2002, at
A7.
188 In his opening statement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, Senator Sarbanes stated his understanding that "[als investors
make the financial decisions that significantly shape their lives and assure their
families' well-being, they must be able to rely on information available to them as
being complete, accurate, timely and comprehensible." Accounting and Investor
ProtectionIssues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies: Oversight Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002)
(opening statement of Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urban Affairs).
189 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
190 Id. at 658 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 60412 (1980) and stating that trading on
misappropriated information "undermines the integrity of, and investor confidence
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existence of this sort of market was growing. 191 Viewed in this
context, the provision of criminal sanctions that extended the
reach of criminal law may only marginally have a therapeutic
Created for internal
effect on the political community.
consumption in the United States, the criminal provisions
represent both an attempt to assure the investing public that
something grand is being done, while at the same time
protecting the business elite from a serious erosion of their
position or status. Sure, some members of the elite will have to
be sacrificed-partners at Arthur Andersen, 192 certain "livin'
large" corporate officers and executives, 193 and perhaps, even
some lawyers. 194 Of course, there will also be a number of ruined
middle-class lives as well; principally the host of key assistants
whose testimony will be necessary to paint a legally plausible
morality tale writ almost larger than life about the excesses of
these sacrificial elite actors. 195 The bulk of business people,
in, the securities markets").
191 See, e.g., Jerry Markon & Richard B. Schmitt, Q&A: The In's and Out's of
Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2002, at C1.
192 Arthur Andersen LLP was charged and convicted for obstruction of justice.
See Carrie Johnson & Peter Behr, Andersen Guilty Of Obstruction;Accounting Firm
Will End Audit Work, WASH. POST, June 16, 2002, at Al.
193 In addition to the Rigas family from Adelphia, the following have also been
indicted or convicted on criminal charges: Former Enron CFO, David Fastow and
former Enron employee Michael Kopper; Former Tyco CEO, L. Dennis Kozlowski,
and Former Tyco CFO, Mark H. Swartz; Former WorldCom CFO, Scott D. Sullivan,
Former WorldCom Controller, David F. Myers, and other WorldCom officials,
including: Buford Yates Jr., Betty L. Vinson, and Troy M. Normand. See Andrew
Backover, 2 More Ex-Worldcom Players to Plead Guilty, USA TODAY, Oct. 10, 2002,
at 6B; Peter J. Howe, Adelphia Executives Indicted; ChargesAgainst 3 Rigases and
Their Associates Include Securities Fraud, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2002, at Dl;
The Fall of Enron, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 20, 2002, at A26; Nicholas
Varchaver, Fall From Grace; Mark Belnick's Indictment in the Tyco Scandal Has
Left Friends in Shock and Colleagues Bewildered. What Went Wrong?, FORTUNE,
Oct. 28, 2002, at 112.
194 For example, Tyco's general counsel, Mark A. Belnick. See Varchaver, supra
note 193.
195 In conformity with a pattern of prosecutorial behavior learned from years
participating in the courtroom campaigns of the "war" against drugs, state and
federal prosecutors have targeted lower level employees who are less able, because
of their inferior social and economic status, to resist the full force of the coercive
power of government. These targets of prosecution then are permitted to negotiate a
plea agreement in return for testimony against their superiors. One can clearly see
the pattern at work in the slow government campaign against the senior officials at
WorldCom. By October 11, 2002, four mid-level WorldCom accounting employees
were targeted by government prosecutors and pleaded guilty in exchange for lighter
sentences and testimony against higher-level executives. See WorldCom Ex-
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however will be left alone, with positions and status intact. 196
The second is the global institutional trade community. The
197
world business community is increasingly interlinked.
American participation in regional trade associations, principally
NAFTA,198 created a regional trade association between the
United States, Canada, and Mexico.
The World Trade
99
Organization' requires the maintenance of the reputation of
American business, as well as some stability and predictability
with respect to American business conduct norms. To some
extent, the American scandals damaged that reputation, as well
as the standing of American business within the world
community. 200 That loss of reputation could hurt world financial
markets. 20 1 It could also hurt American authority in the
Accountant Vinson Pleads Guilty to Fraud,AFX Eur. Focus, Oct. 11, 2002, available
at LEXIS, News Group File. These include Betty Vinson, former accounting
department employee, Troy Normand, former director of legal entity accounting,
Buford Yates, former chief accounting officer, and David Myers, former comptroller
of WorldCom. Id. "Lawyers said Vinson, Yates, Myers and Normand are likely to
provide evidence against former top WorldCom executives, possibly including exCEO Bernie Ebbers and former chief financial officer Scott Sullivan, in exchange for
lenient sentencing in the case." Id. For a critical discussion of such governmental
behavior, see, for example, Ellen S. Podgor, White-Collar Cooperators: The
Government in Employer-Employee Relationships, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (2002).
196 It is interesting that the Act has little to say directly about director and
officer compensation issues. Only section 304(a)(1) discusses forfeiture of bonuses or
other incentive based compensation by officers, and even this clause is limited to
chief executive and financial officers. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, § 304(a)(1), 116 Stat. 745, 778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a)(1)).
197 See, e.g., Michael Gruson, The Global Securities Market: Introductory
Remarks, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 303; cf.Michael Mussa, FactorsDriving Global
Economic Integration (2000), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2000/
082500.htm.
198 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605.
199 The World Trade Organization serves as the institutional framework
through which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is implemented.
General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188.
Much negotiation with respect to commercial issues on a global scale now occurs
within the WTO framework.
200 "What happened inside Enron, WorldCom, Xerox and perhaps many other
corporations made a nonsense of the integrity of the US accounting system and
exposed American corporate policy as, at worst, the domain of the criminal." A
World PlunderedBy Greed and Double Standards, SUNDAY HERALD, June 30, 2002,
at 10, available at LEXIS, News Group File; see also Aude Genet, EU Seeks
CorporateAction Plan to Avoid US-Style Scandals, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 1,

2002, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
201 See Silvia Ascarelli et al., Stocks Sink on Effect of U.S. CorporateScandals,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at C13 (noting world stock exchanges industrial
averages dropped in light of U.S. corporate scandals); see also Scandals Shake Faith
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continuing negotiations relating to issues of global trade. 20 2 The
global business community, just like the American public, had to
be assured that something was being done to correct the
situation. In a large sense, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, along with a
new more formally cooperative attitude on the part of American
20 3
officials, was meant to satisfy that need.
The third set of actors to whom the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
provisions were directed consists of countries that are said to be
in transition to free market economies and democratic political
institutions. These are the communities of.nations that have
been subject to intense lobbying with respect to their
economies-from Russified kleptocracies 2 4 to states riddled with
corruption. 2 5 With respect to these states, the American model
of corporate governance has been raised as an ideal. 20 6 The
in U.S. Model, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 28, 2002, at Al.
202 Indeed, the recent European trip of Harvey Pitt emphasized the weaker
position of the United States vis-a-vis its major global trading partners in the area
of regulatory reform. "Responding to criticism that the United States practices a
kind of economic imperialism by requiring some foreign companies to comply with a
new corporate oversight law [the Act], Mr. Pitt told a gathering of European
accounting professionals today, 'We seek to usher in a new regulatory regime in
concert with you, not impose our solutions on you."' Suzanne Kapner, S.E.C. Chief
Promises to Cooperate With Europe, NY TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at Wl.
203 After the passage of the Act, the popular press reported positive reactions
across the industrialized world. See, e.g., Lydia Adetunji & Andrew Hill, New Law
Turns the Spotlight on the Laggards, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at 24; Corporate
Law Must Be Tackled, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Aug. 5, 2002, at 54.
204 A kleptocracy can be loosely defined as a nation suffering from regimes of
institutionalized corruption. Many of the countries emerging out of the Soviet Union
have been described in terms of wide-ranging institutionalized corruption in which
an apparatus of the state is used to steal the nation's wealth for the benefit of the
ruler's family and confidants. Russia, especially before the Presidency of Vladimir
Putin, was sometimes held up as a paramount example of this form of governance.
See, e.g., Steven Solnick, Russia Over the Edge, 7 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 126 (1998);
MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, KAZAKHSTAN: UNFULFILLED PROMISE (2002). See generally
SUSAN
ROSE-ACKERMAN,
CORRUPTION
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999).
205

AND

GOVERNMENT:

CAUSES,

For a discussion of the kleptocracies of Africa and Asia, see, for example,

THOMAS L.

FRIEDMAN,

THE

LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE

146-151

(1999);

Okechukwu Oko, Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in Nigeria: A Reform
Prospectus, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 397 (2002) (detailing the various causes of
corruption in Nigerian business, politics, and military); cf Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The
Right to a Corruption-FreeSociety as an Individual and Collective Human Right:
Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime Under InternationalLaw, 34 INT'L LAW.
149 (2000) (discussing the extent of corruption in various countries, legislative
attempts to deal with the problem, and barriers to enforcement).
206 See, e.g., Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate
Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1801 (2000); Jacques
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scandals of 2000-2002 significantly tarnished the image of
American business that this country projects. They raised the
possibility of cynicism and a sense of a double standard by the
emerging country elites are to be denied what apparently passes
for acceptable conduct in the United States. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act's criminal provisions serve as damage control. They also
serve as a model for behavior: when the United States is beset by
examples of corruption in business, the government institutions
act swiftly to identify and curb that behavior. Emerging states
20 7
will be urged to do the same.
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